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We are involved in a war of extermination. It is the relentless-
ness of this war that makes protecting coastal resources so different
from almost any other environmental struggle. Dirty air is revers-
ible. Trees grow back. Rivers can be cleaned up. More wilderness
areas can be designated. I have spent much of my adult life trying to
reverse and grow back, to clean up and designate. My recent home
is on a coast so vast that it holds one-quarter of the Nation's wet-
lands, so rich that it produces almost one-third of the Nation's sea-
food.' This coast, however, is disappearing so rapidly that the
measures needed to save it are almost at the limits of technology, to
say nothing of economics and political will.' And, as with almost all
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University Law Center, 1967. The author served as General Counsel (1971-1979) and
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1. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND COASTAL
MANAGEMENT SECTION, LOUISIANA DEP'T OF TRANSP. & DEV., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACT STATEMENT & THE PROPOSED LOUISIANA COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM 26 (1980)
[hereinafter IMPACT STATEMENT].
2. See Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences and Remedies, 58 TUL.
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coastal resources, when it is gone, it is gone forever.
This is not an article of despair. It is an argument that, to save
coastal resources in any semblance of the abundance and productiv-
ity that we enjoy today-which is only about half of what we origi-
nally inherited-we need to recognize the limitations of the
approaches on which we currently rely. We are asking federal regu-
lation, such as that under section 404 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA),3 to do too much. We are expecting state regulation, such as
that under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),4 to over-
come formidable economic and political pressures without the safe-
guard of a clear national mandate. We look to the "National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System"'-a misnomer on the or-
der of "Atoms for Peace"-to somehow trace estuarine pollution
back to discharge sources and bring about their (dare I say it?) elim-
ination. We expect federal water resource agencies, in particular
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), to develop projects and
practices to restore coastal wetlands when their primary mission
runs in precisely the opposite direction.
As I pull my head out of the Louisiana controversy to view the
Great Lakes, the Chesapeake, the Carolinas, Florida, the Gulf Coast,
and the Pacific, I see nothing more positive than a reduced rate of
loss.6 With enormous effort, and occasional acts of courage by reg-
ulatory agencies, we manage to stop a shopping center here,7 or a
coastal resort there.8 We cannot, however, expect public servants to
fight each of these projects to the finish. The fights are brutal, and
eventually even the best of public servants move on to private lives.
L. REv. 3. 101-65 (1984). See also LOUISIANA WETLAND PROTECTION PANEL, U.S. ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SAVING LOUISIANA'S COASTAL WETLANDS. THE NEED
FOR A LONG-TERM PLAN OF ACTION 39-78 (1987) [hereinafter PANEL REPORT] (detailing
possible measures for curtailing Louisiana wetland loss); THE COALITION TO RESTORE
COASTAL LOUISIANA, COASTAL LOUISIANA-HERE TODAY GONE TOMORROW? (1987) [here-
inafter COALITION REPORT] (recommending numerous structural, regulatory, and insti-
tutional programs to save the Louisiana coastal zone).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1562 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
6. Louisiana is losing about 50 square miles each year, an area the size of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In ten years that rate will double. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-
13; COALITION REPORT. supra note 2, at 7-8.
7. See Newport Calleria Group v. Deland, 618 F. Supp. 1179 (D.D.C. 1985) (devel-
oper unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the EPA from initiating proceedings under
§ 404(c) of the Clean Water Act to prohibit the Army Corps of Engineers from issuing a
permit for discharges into navigable waters).
8. See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (Army Corp of
Engineers' denial of permit to dredge and fill one tract of land was lawful and did not
constitute a "taking" under the fifth amendment), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
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In the meantime, south of the city of New Orleans, 1000 acres have
recently been developed into a Jack Nicklaus golf course. The miti-
gation consists of a small swamp park with a boardwalk.9
All over America, development is moving to the sea. At the
same time, on every coastline, the sea is moving in to meet it. In
between, the coast is rotten with conventional pollution.' ° No one
knows how bad the heavy metals are." Throughout the remaining
estuaries we maintain an unimaginably large network of highways,
causeways, pipelines, and canals.' 2 Each one destroys. Each one is a
trade-off-as is the trade-off for the golf course, and the one for a
sewage outfall. The best we have been able to do under current
federal and state programs is to make trades and buy time. Over
time, however, we will lose. It is the principle of cut flowers. With
enough fresh water, they take longer to die.
This article makes several proposals to save the coast. None
may be original, but they are original to me in that ten years ago I
would not have thought them necessary or prudent. I offer them
now because I see no other way to avoid a long war of attrition that,
by its very nature, we cannot win.
I. COASTAL DEVELOPMENT
It's a tough, nasty business telling people what to do with their
property.'
3
The greatest pressure on coastal resources comes from their
simple conversion to other uses. We have literally filled in and elim-
inated the wetlands of San Francisco Bay. 4 Cape Cod is all but un-
9. Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Aug. 4, 1987, at B-3, col. 1.
10. One-half of Louisiana's oyster beds, the largest in the Nation, are closed each
year due to fecal coliform. Sewage pollution closes prime oyster beds, Times-Picayune (New
Orleans), Dec. 6, 1983, § I, at 13, col. 1.
II. See B.J. Presley, Cadmium Concentrations in Oysters: A Review (Nov. 1986) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author); J.B. Mathison, Cadmium Intake in South Louisiana
(undated and unpublished manuscript on file with author). See generally OFFICE OF TECH-
NOlOG- ASSESSMENT. WASTES IN MARINE ENVIRONMENTS 123-40 (1987) [hereinafter
OTAI (impacts of waste pollutants on human health).
12. See D. Davis, Louisiana Canals and Their Influence on Wetland Development (1973) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, available in L.S.U. library); R. Turner, R. Costanza & W.
Scaife, Canals and IWetland Erosion Rates in Coastal Louisiana, FIsH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON COASTAL EROSION AND
WETLAND MODIFICATION IN LOUISIANA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OPTIONS 73-84
(1982).
13. Efforts to Combat .. larine Pollution Not Keeping Pace With Growth, State Group Told,
(Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1934-35 (Dec. 18, 1987) (statement of Jim
Ross, Director of Oregon Dep't of Land Conservation & Dev.).
14. Coastal Degradation Threatens Millions with Loss of Livelihood, EPA Official Says, [Cur-
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recognizable to those who were born there as recently as twenty
years ago. You can drive for hours down the coast of Florida, from
Jacksonville to Miami Beach, in search of a place to access the beach,
at times in search of a place from which to view it. Every coastal
state has a similar story. Indeed, every estuary has-those estuaries,
of course, that still remain.
There is no identifiable decision to develop the coast. The de-
velopment is cumulative and case-by-case. And this is exactly where
the regulatory programs fail. Each proposal seems so reasonable.
How can a proposed development plan be denied on the grounds of
what has already been done, by entirely different parties, some time
before? Even more problematic, how can it be denied on the basis
of what others will do, or may do, in the future?"5 For fifteen years,
we have expected the section 404 program and state coastal man-
agement programs to stem the tide. Even in the best of circum-
stances and with the most enlightened of personnel, however, these
programs cannot bar all, or even most, of the development of
coastal wetlands, ridges, and islands. They can produce trade-offs.
Under the circumstances of everyday life, with personnel who are
not always enlightened or lion-hearted, the trades are poor and the
rate of destruction is high.' 6
Regulatory programs are also limited by manpower and money.
There are not enough regulators in America to do the analysis of
each wetland and coastal development proposal called for under
federal and state laws. The bureaucracy is nonetheless daunting.
For instance, the New Orleans District of the Corps operates its per-
rent Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1585 (Oct. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Coastal
Degradation].
15. To be sure, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), and section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344
(1982), and their implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, .27(b)(7) (1987), and
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(3) (1987), require consideration of "cumulative" impacts. In prac-
tice, however, this consideration is limited to directly related and nearly imminent ac-
tions. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 408-15 (1987) (further development
could be allowed without a regional Environmental Impact Statement). The Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) is choosing to limit the consideration of these impacts still
further by analyzing only the effects of the activity permitted (e.g., a pier) instead of the
associated development (e.g., the manufacturing plant). Baldwin, EPA Refers Proposed
Corps .VEP Procedures to CEQ, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., May-June 1985, at 3, 4. Once
such minimal consideration is allowed, it will rarely stand in the way of permit approval.
16. In Louisiana, for example, with the highest volume of coastal permit issuance in
the Nation, a review of Corps permits for the years 1980-1986 shows an average of 6.3
denials a year, or approximately 0.64 percent of the applications considered. Inspection
of Records of Permit Section, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, by
James Yates (Nov. 16-20, 1987).
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mit review program at $2.5 million a year.' 7 This figure, of course,
does not include the Louisiana coastal permit program, nor the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) program, nor personnel from
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and Louisiana parish (county)
coastal programs, all of whom are also involved in permit reviews.
We have created a Dr. Seuss-like machine that produces occasion-
ally good, but more often poor, compromises at the end of an elabo-
rate pipeline. Indeed, the operation is made more effective by the
very time it consumes, by attrition, and by concessions offered by
applicants simply to be able to "get on with the job," than it is by
any consideration of the merits of a particular case.' 8 The EPA, rec-
ognizing its inability to cover the required waterfront, is now pro-
posing to distinguish between "important" and "unimportant"
wetlands"9-a proposal that the construction-minded Corps has
been quick to endorse. In a real sense, the federal government, mo-
tivated both by its own limitations and by continuing political pres-
sures for wetland development, is getting ready to make a macro-
trade. All but the "important" will go.
As a legal matter these programs may be doomed to an even
more limited future. The strongest lever available to regulatory
agencies is section 404(b)(1) of the CWA,2 ° and its analogue in state
17. Telephone interview with Ron Ventola, Chief, Permitting Branch, Operations
Division, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Nov. 25, 1987).
18. Applicant concessions often take the form of proposals to "mitigate" project im-
pacts, proposals that the Corps often sees as "tipp[ing] the public interest balance" in
favor of project approval. Barrows, Mitigation in the Army Corps of Engineers Regulatbry
Program, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 1i. For a more jaundiced view,
see Wilmar, Mitigation: The Applicant's Perspective, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct.
1986, at 16, 17 (mitigation unfairly pressures applicants to make environmental conces-
sions in order to expedite project approval).
19. See Remarks of Allan Hirsch, Director, Office of Federal Activities, U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, EPA J., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 4 ("We need to focus more of our
attention on identifying, in cooperation with the states and other federal agencies, im-
portant wetlands that require special attention before applicants for 404 permits are
received.").
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (1982). As implemented by the EPA, the regulation
requires:
Where the activity associated with a discharge which is proposed for a special
aquatic site . . . does not require access or proximity to or siting within the
special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose (i.e., is not "water
dependent"), practicable alternatives that do not involve special aquatic sites
are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise.
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (1987).
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coastal programs, 2' which require wetlands development to be
"wetland dependent." Viewed in its strongest light, this test is
analogous to that of section 4(f) of the Department of Transporta-
tion Act,22 requiring a strong showing that a nonwetland site is in-
feasible before a wetland permit is granted. 3 One difficulty with
this view is that, to date, few courts have been willing to apply the
section 404(b)(1) guidelines this forcefully. 24 The more fundamen-
21. Louisiana's coastal use guidelines are applied to coastal activity "to the maxi-
mum extent practicable," a term defined in the guidelines.
Guideline 1.8. In those guidelines in which the modifier "maximum extent
practicable" is used, the proposed use is in compliance with the guideline if the
standard modified by the term is complied with. If the modified standard is not
complied with, the use will be in compliance with the guidelines if the permit-
ting authority finds, after a systematic consideration of all pertinent informa-
tion regarding the use, the site and the impacts of the use as set forth in
guideline 1.6, and a balancing of their relative significance, that the benefits
resulting from the proposed use would clearly outweigh the idverse impacts
resulting from non-compliance with the modified standard and there are no
feasible and practical alternative locations, methods and practices for the use
that are in compliance with the modified standard and:
a) significant public benefits will result from the use, or;
b) • the use would serve important regional, state or national interests, in-
cluding the national interest in resources and the siting of facilities in the
coastal zone identified in the coastal resources program, or;
c) the use is coastal water dependent.
IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 53.
22. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1982) (Secretary of Transportation may approve a transpor-
tation project requiring the use of publicly owned lands only if there is no feasible alter-
native and any harmful effects to the lands are minimized).
23. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the
Supreme Court stringently interpreted the standard for consideration of alternatives
under § 4(f):
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act and § 138 of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act are clear and specific directives. Both the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act provide that the
Secretary 'shall not approve any program or project' that requires the use of
any public parkland 'unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to
the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to such park . . . .' This language is a plain and explicit bar to
the use of federal funds for construction of highways through parks--only the
most unusual situations are exempted ....
Congress clearly did not intend that cost and disruption of the community
were to be ignored by the Secretary. But the very existence of the statutes
indicates that protection of parkland was to be given paramount importance.
The few green havens that are public parks were not to be lost unless there
were truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost or community
disruption resulting from alternative routes reached extraordinary magnitudes.
If the statutes are to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot approve the de-
struction of parkland unless he finds that alternative routes present unique
problems.
Id. at 411-13 (1970) (citations and footnotes omitted).
24. See, e.g., Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1046-48 (5th Cir.
A----
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tal difficulty is that, whether an alternative site is available or not, a
denial of the right to develop the applied-for wetlands site may now
constitute a "taking" for which compensation is constitutionally re-
quired.25 Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this
question in the context of a wetland permit denial, its recent utter-
ances are ominous. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes" the
Court, while reaffirming broad federal jurisdiction under section
4.04, went out of its way to raise and reserve the question of whether
the regulation constituted a taking.27 In First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v. County of Los Angeles 28 the Court, while again reserv-
ing the taking claim,29 declared that local governments would be
liable in money damages for decisions that were subsequently adju-
dicated to be takings."0 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission"'
the Court went further by declaring coastal use mitigation require-
ments, which provided public access in return for construction on
beachfront property, an unconstitutional taking.2"' These opinions
will, at the very least, discourage state regulators from exercising
their authority."3 And where they do not discourage, before an in-
creasingly conservative federal judiciary, taking claims may prevail
outright.
To recapitulate, the very case-by-case nature of coastal regula-
tion frustrates the goal of coastal protection. Individual permit de-
cisions cannot, by their very nature, be "cumulative." They are
intrinsically small and, on the merits, hit-or-miss. What they hit may
be resubmitted for approval the following month or year. What
they miss is converted, for the most part, irreversibly. The more
broadly one regulates, however, the more uniformly and strictly one
1985) (upholding the Corps' granting of six permits to clear wetlands for agricultural
purposes as permissible under the guidelines).
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend V.
26. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
27. Id. at 126-29 & n.6.
28. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
29. Id. at 2384-85.
30. Id. at 2388-89.
31. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
32. Id. at 3150.
33. The effect of these recent Supreme Court pronouncements on local governmen-
tal actions cannot be overstated. Attorneys for development interests have been quick to
pick up the cry of "taking," along with the implied threat of governmental liability, in a
range of local zoning decisions in the New Orleans area and in the proceedings of the
Lake Pontchartrain Task Force, an inter-governmental agency established to develop a
management plan for Louisiana's first area of critical environmental concern under the
state's coastal management program.
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acts to preclude development, and the more one runs the risk of an
uncompensated taking.
This analysis leads to the following conclusions. First, regula-
tory programs cannot work because, at bottom, they are only that-
regulatory programs.3 4 They have bought us time; for this reason
they need to be defended and applied. But that is all they can do.
We must use this hard-won time to obtain an approach that meets
the problem. Federal proposals within the past five years skirmish
closer to the objective: one would bar federal infrastructure assist-
ance in wetland areas and raise the price of, or eliminate, federal
flood insurance; 5 another accelerates the acquisition of wetlands.3 "
While each will be of assistance and each will buy more time, none
will suffice. The federal government and coastal states must pro-
claim the overriding public interest in the protection of coastal ar-
eas; exclude certain classes of development, including major
industrial, commercial, and residential uses; and permit, on a case-
by-case basis, a residuum of more passive economic and other uses
34. In this conclusion I find myself in unaccustomed agreement with those repre-
sentatives of the Reagan administration charged with the execution of the § 404 pro-
gram, who have insisted that § 404 is not an appropriate vehicle for wetland protection.
See, e.g., Address by William R. Gianelli, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), at
Water Forum '81 (Aug. 10, 1981) ("Section 404 program has gone far beyond its origi-
nally envisioned scope and beyond the appropriate role of the federal government in
regulating the development . . . of our nation's waters and wetlands.") (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
The Coastal Zone Management Program, on the other hand, has been resisted by
the administration because, in some instances, implementing states have used their au-
thorities effectively to bar development supported by the federal government. See Rea-
gan 4dministration Turns to Courts to Limit Coastal Zone Management Act Program, [Current
Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1334-36 (Dec. 12, 1986) (Delaware blanket prohibi-
tion on "bulk transfers" of coal, if permitted by CZMA, would violate the commerce
clause according to the Justice Department). Those CZMA state programs also suffer
from the same "spottiness" that characterized all water pollution programs prior to the
"federalization" of pollution control by the 1972 Clean Water Act (CWA). Indeed, it
often seems that the less coastline that remains, the more vigorous is [he program to
protect it. This phenomenon leaves the most important areas, such as Louisiana. vul-
nerable to the pressures of a weak local economy and strong development interests. In
this matter, the administration's policy of "new federalism," returning authority to local
governments, becomes a policy of the least protection possible. Where local programs
are strong, the federal government seeks to override them in the courts or to defund
them. See id. at 1334-36. Where they are weak, they so remain.
35. See WI'att Seeks Support for Mleasure Protecting I'etlands by Ending Subsidies. Raising Fees,
(Current Developmentsl Env't Rep. (BNA) 1666 (jan. 28, 1983) (former Secretary of the
InteriorJames Watt proposed bill to preserve wetlands by extending conservation loan
and grant programs, providing new and higher user fees, and ending federal subsidies
for destructive projects). ,o
36. Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, 100 Stat. 3582.
1988] 365
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sufficient to enable the legislation to survive constitutional attack.3 7
This approach would have been, even to me, unthinkable a dec-
ade ago. It will certainly be unthinkable now to many state legisla-
tors, developers, and landowners. The time may not be right for its
passage. But as the coastal base diminishes beach by beach, estuary
by estuary, and state by state, the pressures for stronger action
grow."8 At some point before the entire Nation is reduced to the
condition of Long Island-a highly developed seacoast with small
museums of protected marsh-we will arrive at this approach, which
is simply a stringent form of zoning. The question, as with most en-
vironmental solutions, is not "whether" but "when." The sooner
that administrators, environmental organizations, fishermen, and
other would-be coastal protectors recognize the limits of their ex-
isting approaches and the need to act more directly, the more likely
we are to finda genuine solution in time. 9
This approach, which could be called "genuine coastal zoning,"
runs its risk with a Supreme Court that is both increasingly hostile to
37. The residual uses required to survive a constitutional attack remain undefined at
this point in the law. While the literature on "taking" is enormous, each case will re-
volve on its own facts. The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement, however, Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). reaffirms the
longstanding principle that governmental restrictions will not constitute a taking requir-
ing compensation so long as an economic use remains available to the owner. Accord
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
38. Perhaps the best example of these pressures is the Chesapeake Bay Task Force,
which is still laboring under the constraints of existing federal and state law. As a polit-
ical matter, this stage of foundering about for answers with inadequate tools may be a
prerequisite to moving more directly on the problem. This article attempts to point the
way, and to some degree predict the way, that we will ultimately have to go to protect
the Chesapeake Bay, Mobile Bay, Baritaria Bay, and the rest of America's coast.
39. America may be more ready for this approach than we believe. The collapse of
the Nation's wetlands is now recognized, even by the most conservative of opi-
nionmakers, as a national problem. The columnistJames Kilpatrick has recently written:
Twenty-five or 30 years ago, if I may intrude a personal note, I probably would
have denounced the court's opinion [Riverside Bavi'iew Homes) as an unwarranted
extension of federal control over matters more wisely left to the states or to
individual decision. In those fire-eating days, as a young editor in love with the
state's rights and property rights. I tended to resist every extension of federal
power.
For the most part, I still feel the same way. On most issues I remain an
unreconstructed states' righter, but the passing years have persuaded me that
on problems that demonstrably are national in scope, a national approach is
better. The disappearance of American wetlands is a national problem, involv-
ing damage to environmental systems that leap across state lines.
Kilpatrick. Strikitig a judiciary blow for America's wetlands, Times-Picayune (New Orleans),
Dec. 17, 1985, at A-17, col. I.
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regulation and protective of individual property interests.40 Never-
theless, based on past .opinions of the Court, as opposed to the
predilections of its more recent members, the "genuine coastal zon-
ing" approach should prevail. The public purposes behind the zon-
ing approach are compelling and quantifiable. The Louisiana
coastal marshes, for example, have been valued in their natural state
at $32 billion.4 The residual uses in mineral leasing, agriculture,
fish and wildlife harvest, and other related interests should suffice to
defeat the taking claim.42 In any event, the approach should be
tried, as it is, with one exception, the most direct way to save the
coast.
If the proposed legislation fails in the legislature or the courts,
we would need to act even more directly: we take, or at least we take
the development rights, and we compensate. Given the uncertain-
ties of coastal development under current regulatory programs, the
price of development rights may be less than feared. For example,
assume 10 million acres of coastal wetlands are to be acquired 43 at a
market price of$1,000 per acre.44 The cost would be $10 billion for
fee simple title, perhaps half that for development rights alone.45
The cost is certainly not de minimus. The cost, however, can be
amply justified by the economic benefits derived from coastal re-
sources on a. sustained-yield basis, and by savings in future invest-
ments we will not have to make to protect beachfront property. The
case for acquisition can be made.46
The question remains: Who pays? The answer should parallel
that provided for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites47 and the
40. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
4 1. See Houck, supra note 2, at 99.
42. See supra note 37
43. Some rather extensive coastlines such as that of Louisiana, where individual and
commercial development is not a threat, need not be acquired at all.
44. The price is considerably less in Louisiana, in the order of $400 per acre. See
Harrison Ryan v. Southern Natural Gas Co., No. 86-794, slip op. at 18 (E.D. La. filed
Oct. 27, 1987).
45. The relationship of the price of development rights to fee simple rights will of
course vary greatly from Cape Cod, where development is the primary value, to Texas,
where subsurface minerals are the primary value.
46. Indeed, a more palatable means of acquiring these rights might be to set up a
fund for their acquisition on a voluntary basis, coupled with a stringent regulatory pro-
gram. I have yet, however, to see such an approach succeed on more than a localized
basis to protect a local resource. Perhaps the largest example is the complex scheme of
restrictions and blandishments that make up the program to preserve the New Jersey
Pine Barrens. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-I to :18A-49 (West Supp. 1987). These local
efforts will result in a few more museums. The alternative is a national program.
47. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
3671988]
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abandoned mines of Appalachia.4 In the case of wetlands, the de-
struction has been caused largely by real estate development. To be
sure, not all developers have destroyed wetlands. But it is equally
true that a number of chemical companies have left no toxic traces
and at least some coal companies can be assumed not to have
wasted their lands. Developers as a whole, however, are more re-
sponsible than anyone else for the damage done to the wetlands.
Developers are also in a position to pay. One direct method
would be a federal or state tax on new residential and commercial
construction. With 1,807,100 new housing starts49 in 1986, a pre-
mium of only $100 per residential structure would yield $180 mil-
lion annually." °  This would be more than enough for a
compensation program to be phased in over the next ten years while
the existing regulatory programs do their best to hold the line. Al-
ternative or supplemental revenues could be obtained from a tax on
real estate transfers, including, or restricted entirely to, transfers of
undeveloped lands: Additional revenues might also be raised in the
form of transfer fees, building permit fees, or taxes on existing
property owners in coastal areas whose property values could be in-
creased significantly by barring new development.5 For acquisition
in the short term while the need is acute, general funds could be
appropriated, reimbursed later by these premiums. This is the
mechanism that has fueled the federal acquisition of wetland water-
fowl habitat.52 Even if the federal government were unwilling to im-
pose these taxes directly, it could condition state coastal
management funding on the passage of state legislation imposing
such taxes and allocating the proceeds to coastal acquisition. Simi-
lar requirements have been highly successful in the Pittman-Robert-
1980. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (also known as CERCLA or
"Superfund").
48. Abandoned Mine Reclamations, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
49. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. HOUSING STARTS 3 (Aug. 1987).
50. One could reduce this premium considerably by imposing a similar fee on corn-
rn*ercial construction. Another alternative would be to assess a fee based on the value of
residential and commercial construction. Residential construction was valued at $187
million in 1986 and private nonresidential construction totalled $91 million. BUREAU OF
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VALUE OF NEW CONSTRUCTION PUT IN PLACE 5 (May
1987).
51. These premiums are, of course, adjustable in relation to commercial premiums,
premiums on other construction (e.g.. shopping centers), the total amount envisaged as
needed, and the time over which the program is projected.
52. See Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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son 53 and Dingell-Johnson 54 programs.
The purpose here is not to propose a specific scheme, but
rather to indicate that mechanisms are available for the job-a job
that at first blush could appear impossibly massive. Granted, the
real estate industry will not like it, but the Superfund was not well
liked by the chemical industry either. All of these solutions depend,
initially, on recognizing what needs to be done. That recognition
begins with accepting the fact that what we are doing now will not
suffice.
II. COASTAL DESTRUCTION
Fifteen years ago, our situation was desperate .... Today it is at the
catastrophic level. It is now a foregone conclusion that most of the remain-
ing wetlands in Louisiana's coastal zone will be lost along with many of our
coastal communities.
5 5
As far reaching (or far-fetched) as the previous proposal may
seem, it does not go far enough. Large areas of the coast are being
destroyed directly by a kind of development that has nothing to do
with encroaching human occupation. I will speak from my own ex-
perience of the Louisiana coastal zone, with occasional references to
Florida and Alaska. Louisiana has 397 miles of coastline, 7,721 total
miles of shoreline, and 7,656 square miles of estuaries within its
coastal zone.5 6 They are being taken, at a rate that staggers the im-
agination, by an assault of transportation and transmission corridors
that is killing the host in the fashion of "a million blows."
In Louisiana the onslaught stems primarily from oil and gas de-
velopment and the related demands of navigation.57 Oil and gas
deposits underlie the Louisiana coastal zone, as they do the Alaskan
coastal plain and the southern wetlands of Florida. To access sites
in Louisiana the industry dredges canals, hundreds of new canals a
year-an estimated 10,000 miles of canals within the last fifty years.
To export the product the industry lays pipelines-thousands of
53. Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 669 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
54. Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act of 1950, 16 U.S.C. § 777 (1982 & Supp IV
1986).
55. Erosion Expert: La. needs plan to save its marshes from ruin, Times-Picayune (New Or-
leans). Nov. 10, 1984. at A-26, col. 2 (quoting Dr. Sherwood Gagliano, head of Coastal
Environments, Inc.).
56. OFFICE OF WATER RESOURCES, LOUISIANA DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.
ILOUISIANA WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN 1 (1987).
57. The data and the processes described in the following two paragraphs of the text
arc taken from Houck. supra note 2. at 24-70 (and sources cited therein).
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miles of pipeline-throughout the coastal zone. The Louisiana
marsh is fragile, more fragile than the Everglades. The canals
erode. They not only remain in place, as they do across the Alaskan
tundra, they widen through their banks at a rate that will double
their size within ten years. In twenty years they will have doubled
again. Double and double-that is the rate of cancer.
The damage does not end here. This is only the most direct
effect. Each canal and pipeline provides new access for the salt wa-
ters of the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf intrudes, its more saline waters
killing the plant life that holds the soils together; the roots dis-
integrate; the soil disintegrates; and the marshes disappear. The
canals also bisect natural waterflow. They squeeze off subsurface
flow as efficiently as a tourniquet. They impound and create lakes,
as well as stagnate and degrade marsh, sometimes miles from their
location. The sum of these effects has led one team of researchers
to conclude: "In general, where canal density is high, land losses
are high; where land losses are low, canal densities are low ....
Canals, therefore, may be responsible for 89% of the total land
loss."" s Similar phenomena and their resultant damages can be
seen in Alaska,59 as well as in the Everglades and the Big Cypress
watershed for Florida's coastal zone.6 To these canals can be ad-
ded networks of roads, dikes, and causeways, each disrupting the
systems that have built the coastal marshes, and on which their sur-
vival depends.
The destruction continues. The Corps' records for the past
seven years show an average of 899 permits yearly for activities in
the Louisiana coastal zone.6 To these individually permitted
58. Scaife, Turner & Costanza, Coastal Louisiana Recent Land Loss and Canal Impacts, 7
ENVTL. MGMT. 433. 440 (1983).
59. For a rosy view of the oil industry's efforts to protect Alaska's "extremely valua-
ble" North Slope wetlands, see Posey, Wetlands and Oil." Coexistence on the Tundra, EPA J.,
Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 19, 20. Atlantic Rockfield Corporation has developed a manual for oil
and gas development on the North Slope that "incorporates the best available civil engi-
neering technology on hydrology in arctic wetlands to maintain natural drainage pat-
terns in wetland and shoreline areas." Id. at 20.
60. Florida's more diverse wetland threats are described in Hamann, The Evolution of
Florida Wetlands Regulation, in ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLANDS MANAGERS, CENTER FOR
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIeILrrv, WETLAND PROTECTION: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF
THE STATES 40 (July 1985) and FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS 40-41 (Mar.
1984) (describing the environmental problems facing South Florida's Palustrine
Wetlands).
61. New Orleans District records show that 1,371 § 404 permits were issued in 1980:
1,202 in 1981; 1,389 in 1982; 1,023 in 1983, 750 in 1984;726 in 1985; and 609 in 1986.
Activities authorized by state or regional permits and by nationwide permits totalled 300
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projects can be added an almost equal number of activities that have
been exempted under general permits.62 The state's coastal zone
records are corroborative.63 The dominant activity in the zone is oil
and gas development. When the price of oil dropped in the early
1980s from $30 to $12 a barrel, the pace of new drilling activity in
the coast dropped accordingly. With the rise of oil to $20 a barrel,
Louisiana has already seen a new surge of exploration.' While this
is welcome news for the Louisiana economy, it is grim news for its
coastal marshes. Unless some new way is found to access these de-
posits, we will cause the destruction of more coastal acreage than we
could ever hope to salvage or replace.6 5
Once again, we are relying on regulatory programs to stem the
tide-programs which are not up to the job. Both the federal sec-
tion 404 program and its Louisiana counterpart require permits for
access canals and transmission corridors. The federal permits are
issued under the Corps' "public interest" guidelines66 and the
EPA's section 404(b)(1) guidelines.67 Louisiana's permits are issued
under its coastal management guidelines which, in pertinent part,
closely resemble the EPA's test in section 404(b)(1). 68 The bottom-
line issue in all permit decisions is the availability of alternatives. In
a typical permit, the applicant will assert that it needs to get from A
to B, and a dredged canal (or, in Florida, the access road) is the only
feasible approach available. A "no action" decision or permit denial
denies the applicant's property right in the deposit. Thus, the per-
mit should be granted.
In a limited sense, the applicant is correct. It may not have an
in 1980; 500 in 1981; 650 in 1982; 733 in 1983; 1,005 in 1984; 1,184 in 1985; and 1,162
in 1986. As can be seen, general permitting has supplanted about half of the individual
permitting of seven years ago, but the level of activity remains near 2,000 actions a year.
Inspection of Records of Permit Section, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers, by James Yates (Nov. 16-20, 1987).
62. Id.
63. See Houck, supra note 2, at 158-59.
64. The rig utilization rate for the Louisiana coastal zone as of September 27, 1987,
stood at 55.6% as opposed to a 29.5% usage rate one year from that date. Times-
Picayune (New Orleans), Sept. 27, 1987, at G-10, col. 1.
65. Even with newly imposed requirements for directional drilling, Louisiana will,
over the next ten years. permit the loss of more marsh acreage to oil and gas canals
(approximately 20,000 acres) than it will create with the proposed $25 million fresh-
water diversion structure at Caernarvon (approximately 16,000 acres). See Houck, lWe
can 7 protect coast 'hile destroying it, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), July 8, 1987, at A- 14.
col. I.
66. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (1987).
67. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 2 1.
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available access alternative. Helicopters are expensive. So is direc-
tional drilling, even if technologically feasible at the given site.6 9
The canal, on the other hand, is the traditional way. An entire
dredging industry is available and willing to dig it. In these deci-
sions, we are limited to the means of the individual applicant and
the state of the art. For these reasons, the regulatory permit process
for wetland development is no more effective than it is for residen-
tial and commercial development. The site is a given. Case-by-case
review does not work. Neither does the state of the art. We need a
program that looks beyond both the individual applicant and the
limits of today's practices.
Such a program is, for largely similar reasons, exactly what the
CWA prescribes for point source discharges: the best available tech-
nology (BAT).7 In 1972 Congress explicitly concluded that the
state of the art should be advanced by "action-forcing" technology
and that the guidelines for this technology, as well as the permits
issued under them, should not be limited to the means of individual
applicants.7 This process was, and remains, an effective way to
clean up pollution.
Unfortunately, for reasons deeply rooted in the politics of
dredge and fill activities, Congress exempted these operations from
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 72
creating an uneasy regulatory partnership between the Corps and
the EPA, and producing decisions that focus on the impacts of the
proposed activity rather than on technology. As we have seen, the
EPA's section 404(b)(1) guidelines do require consideration of
available alternatives; this consideration, however, is limited with re-
gard to oil and gas deposits that are located in one particular loca-
tion. What we are left with is a review of impacts and, perhaps, the
alternative technologies of the moment. What we need instead is
review based on BAT.
A BAT standard is particularly appropriate for oil, gas, and re-
69. To its credit, the Louisiana Geological Survey has begun a case-by-case review of
permits to evaluate the feasibility of directional drilling-a scrutiny that, combined with
the temporary downturn in oil exploration, has led to substantial reductions in new
canals. See Houck, supra note 2, at 151; Telephone interview with Johnny Johnston, Lou-
isiana Geological Survey (Oct. 15. 1987).
70. The CWA prescribes standards for industrial discharges based on, at this point,
the "best practicable control technology currently available." 33 U.S.C. § § 1311. 1314
(1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
71. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle. 590 F.2d 1011, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
72. See SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1386-93
(Comm. Print 1973).
372 [VOL. 47:358
1988] ENDING THE WAR 373
lated activities in the coastal zone. We are dealing with an industrial
category similar to other categories in the NPDES program. This is
a cohesive industry, all of whose members get the job done in the
same basic way. We are dealing with a technology that is as identifi-
able as the treatment of process water from a chemical plant or of
fish remains in a cannery.7 3 Furthermore, as a class or category, few
industries in the United States are in a better position to absorb the
costs of a new technology.-
What would BAT look like? It would be a "practice" stan-
dard, 7  as opposed to an effluent limitation. The guideline would
examine available technologies for analogous operations in the
United States and abroad. It would discover, for example, the con-
struction and use of hovercraft to take passengers, heavy equip-
ment, and even armored companies of United States Marines across
waterways and marshes with only a negligible and temporary im-
pact. 75 It would bring the-experience of England and Alaska to Lou-
isiana and Florida.76 It would assess the costs of these technologies,
calculate their economic impacts, and conclude in all probability
that they are "available" within the meaning of the CWA.77
As a matter of procedure, the EPA should require this technol-
ogy under its section 404(b)(1) guidelines which, as written, appear
broad enough to allow it. 78 Granted, the EPA has never used its
73. Indeed. the technological considerations would be more sophisticated than those
involved in fish processing, for example. See Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615
F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980) (guidelines for canned and preserved seafood processing).
74. See id. at 802 (example of a practice standard).
75. See O'Byrne, Hovering barge may save marshes, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), May
31, 1987, at C-2, col. 3. See also Brown, SAS Begins AP-188 Hovercraft Service, AvIATION
WEEK AND SPACE TECH., Aug. 6, 1984, at 36-37 (details and specifications of Scandina-
vian Airline System's hovercraft service between Denmark and Sweden); Crawford,
Hover vehicles offer uplifting services, OFFSHORE, Feb. 1979, at I I 1-12 (hovercraft vehicles
used in North Sea, Dead Sea, Yukon River, and Persian Gulf by offshore contractors);
Elson, Air Cushion Vehicle Readied for Testing, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., May 23,
1977, at 54-58 (specifications of high-performance air cushion vehicle used as Marine
Corps amphibious advanced assault landing craft).
76. See Hamer, Hovercraft makers prepare for the future, NEw SCIEN riST, Dec. 19-26,
1985, at 34; Ramsden, Hoverbarge Transports Mukluk Drilling Rig, PETROLEUM ENC'R INT'L,
Sept. 1984, at 10-12; Abele & Brown, Arctic Transportation: Operational and Environmental
Evaluation of an Air Cushion Vehicle in Northern Alaska, 99J. PRESSURE VESSEL TECH. 176
(Feb. 1977).
77. For example, technologies recently proposed for the plastics manufacturing cate-
gory will be "available" at a substantial cost to the industry, resulting in a number of
plant closures. Organic Chemicals. Plastics Industry" Face New Costs Under EPA Final Regula-
tions, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1736-38 (Nov. 13, 1987). The value of
the BAT approach is that the technology can be studied on an industry-wide basis, and
its application need not be constrained by the means of an individual applicant.
78. See supra note 20.
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rulemaking authority to develop what is in effect a section 404(b)(1)
BAT standard. Alternatively, then, the Corps could develop and is-
sue the requirement as guidance to its Districts, or to its coastal Dis-
tricts, under -its section 404(a) authority. 79 Whichever agency
chooses to act, the need here is to recognize that alternative tech-
nologies are available and must be used.
The future of the coastal zone depends upon more than arrest-
ing beachfront development. It depends also on new methods to
carry on indispensable economic activity without destroying the
coast. The EPA and the Corps should exercise their section 404
authorities to develop and require these methods."0
III. COASTAL POLLUTION
All the fish around here come and go in cycles, and years back, you
could anticipate the cycles, but today, with the pollution the way it is, you
can't be so sure that a fish that's gone will ever come back at all.8 1
This said, coastal pollution may overwhelm us. With all of the
effort dedicated to water pollution control since 1972, including the
development of technology standards, toxic standards, and a rigor-
ous permit system, coastal estuaries are more polluted than ever by
phosphorous, nitrogen, fecal coliform, and the most common vari-
eties of waste. The available evidence on cadmium and other heavy
metals suggests that toxic pollutants are also on the rise, but are
simply less well documented. 2 Indeed, the major oversights and
outright failures of the CWA are visited directly on the coast:
nonpoint source pollution, sewage discharges, and water-quality-
based remedies for degraded waters. As with the other assaults on
coastal resources, unless they are met more directly, they will
79. The Corps' permitting authority requires consideration of "reasonable alterna-
tive locations and methods to accomplish the objectives of the proposed structure or
work." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(2)(ii) (1987).
80. Although this text is focused on the destruction caused by existing oil and gas
access practices, the same could be said of coastalfishing practices, which accidentally
destroy billions of tons of seafood netted in the process. See Shrimper's conernl on waste,
Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Oct. 13, 1987, at A-12, col. I. (Louisiana's shrimp fleet
"has grown so large that it is destroying over 1.5 billion pounds of sealife (by catch)
annually."). Available technology to exclude fish and other unwanted species, including
endangered sea turtles, has been vigorously resisted by Louisiana's commercial fisher-
men. See Panel notes down delay on TEDs, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Nov. 20, 1987, at
A-5, col. 1.
81. P. MATmIESON, MEN's LIvES: THE SURFMEN AND BAYMEN OF SotrrH FORK (1986),
quoted in OTA. supra note II. at 53.
82. See sources cited supra note II.
374 [VOL. 47:358
1988] ENDING THE WAR 375
prevail.S
A. Nonpoint Source Pollution
Agriculture Commissioner Gil Dozier says he is willing to write off a
northeast Louisiana lake in order to allow cotton farmers near the lake to
spray toxaphene to kill bugs.
Lake Providence is contaminated with the pesticide to the point that eat-
ing a fish from it would be inviting cancer. Dozier insists it poses no danger
to human health so long as fishing is banned.8 4
The CWA emerges, after fifteen years of operation, as a story
with good news and bad. The control of industrial point source dis-
charges has led to a modest and generalized reduction in industrial
pollutants, with the promise of more improvement as best available
technology and toxic standards come in line.85 This is the good
news. The bad news is that this improvement has been offset, in-
deed overwhelmed, by a bewildering range of nonpoint source pol-
lution: runoff from farms, hillsides, construction sites, streets, and
shopping centers.8 ' This year, more than six billion tons of soil will
erode from nonfederal lands alone.8" Approximately 70 percent of
all sediment, 90 percent of fecal and other coliforms, 80 percent of
nitrogen, and 50 percent of all phosphorous pollution comes from
nonpoint sources." This pollution affects almost one-quarter of the
83. A recent government study made three major findings:
Estuaries and coastal waters around the country receive the vast majority
of pollutants introduced into marine environments. As a result, many of these
waters have exhibited a variety of adverse impacts, and their overall health is
declining or threatened.
In the absence of additional measures, new or continued degradation will
occur in many estuaries and some coastal waters around the country during the
next few decades (even in some areas that exhibited improvements in the past).
In contrast, the health of the open ocean generally appears to be better
than that of estuaries and coastal waters.
OTA, supra note 11, at 3.
84. Dozier Supports Sacrificing Lake to Use Pesticide, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge),
May 25, 1979, at B-1, col. i.
85. Toxic Pollutants Concern Most States But Water Quality Better Overall, EPA Says, [Cur-
rent Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1831 (Feb. 24, 1984) [hereinafter WVater Quality].
86. "Nonpoint source pollution .. .continues to degrade the waters of most states
and comprises 'the most important cause of water degradation* in about 10 states." Id.
See also Mon-point Sources Found by INFORM to be Major Contributors of Toxics to Hudson River,
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1263 (Aug. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Hudson)
("Non-point sources of certain chemicals have contributed significantly more pollution
to the Hudson River than point sources."); Sferra, NtVF Urges Water Mandate, NATIONAL
WILDLIFE FEDERATION LEADER, Aug. 1983, at 6, col. I [hereinafter N1,F] ("Thirty-seven
states have reported to the... EPA that nonpoint sources are the major factors interfer-
ing with attainment of water quality standards.").
87. NII'F, supra note 86, at 6.
88. Id.
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Nation's rivers, one-third of its lakes, and, most relevant to this in-
quiry, 19,000 of its 32,000 square miles of estuaries.89 A survey of
2,205 square miles Of Louisiana estuaries characterized more than
one-third of those estuaries as moderately or severely impaired.90
Recent studies conducted upon a much larger scale have put the
total figure at 3,000 square miles,"' more than one-third of the estu-
aries of Louisiana. Whatever the exact figure, every year a band of
"dead water" expands across the Louisiana marshes, and the band
is growing larger.
More sophisticated pollutants also join the nonpoint mix, with
agriculture as the primary source. Fertilizers contribute the major
phosphates loadings. 2 Pesticides have on two occasions eliminated
the Brown Pelican (the Louisiana state bird) from Louisiana
shores.93 From the urban side comes lead, cadmium, oil, and
grease. A recent study on the Hudson River showed that while
point sources discharged 239 pounds of lead, nonpoint sources
were discharging 182,320 pounds. 4 Lead was not alone. Nonpoint
sources on the Hudson also outweighed point sources in
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) (2,500 pounds to 0.4), cadmium
(4,190 pounds to 6), mercury (540 pounds to 0.7), arsenic (24,180
pounds to 28), and oil and grease (9.2 million pounds to 385,730).15
Faced with this and other incontrovertible evidence, Congress
redirected the CWA toward the control of nonpoint sources. 96 In so
doing, it in effect split the nonpoint world into urban and agricul-
tural sources. Urban stormwater, which captures most urban
nonpoint pollution, will come under the NPDES program, with per-
mits required for major urban centers at once, and for smaller cities
over time.97 All major municipalities are scheduled to be under per-
89. Farms polluting La. 's waters, study finds, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Jan. 10,
1987, at A-I, col. 1; A-4, col. 5.
90. OFFICE OF WATER RESOURCES, LOUISIANA DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
1986 WATER QUALITY INVENTORY REPORT § 3.05(b), at 39 (1986) [hereinafter INVENTORY
REPORT].
91. Scientists report on 'dead zones,' Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge). Sept. 23, 1987, at
B-I, col. 5.
92. OTA, supra note II, at 75. Agricultural runoffs contain large amounts of pesti-
cides and herbicides as well. Id.
93. See G. LOWERY. LOUISIANA BIRDS 121-25 (3d ed. 1974).
94. Hudson, supra note 86, at 1263.
95. Id.
96. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, §§ 319 (nonpoint sources),
405 (municipal nonpoint sources). 101 Stat. 7, 55, 69 (1987) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1329, 134 2 (p)).
97. Id. § 405 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 134 2 (p)). The Water Quality Act of 1987
requires that all industries that discharge into sewage systems and municipalities with
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mit by 1993 and in compliance by 1996.98 While it may be argued
that Congress has once again established unrealistic deadlines, par-
ticularly since no city has yet devised a means to control sudden
slugs of stormwater, this program holds the same promise for "ac-
tion-forcing" solutions that the industrial program did fifteen years
ago. Thus, urban nonpoint is at least on a track worth pursuing.
The same cannot be said for agriculture, the major nonpoint
contributor (which may speak volumes about the relative strength of
cities and agriculture in American politics). The dominant role of
agriculture in nonpoint and estuarine pollution is well recognized.
The measures needed to control it are also well known, technologi-
cally available, relatively simple, and, by contrast to municipal and
industrial controls, relatively cheap. We are not talking about the
invention, adoption, and maintenance of hardware. Instead, we are
talking about such farm practices as shelterbelts, winter plowing,
and the application of pesticides. To date, such talk is heresy.
In 1987 Congress looked agricultural pollution in the eye and
fainted. After its "overhaul" of the CWA, the best Congress could
do was provide optional funding for the development of state
nonpoint source programs. 99 According to a 1982 survey of state
programs, forty-seven states already had nonpoint source programs
of one sort or another in place.' 0 At best, the new federal funding
will encourage more specificity in these plans. More likely, it will
produce a second round of paperwork comparable to that generated
in the early 1970s by the hauntingly similar section 208 program.' 0 '
Like the 1987 amendments to the CWA, section 208 was intended to
fund state planning for nonpoint (and point, in an ill-defined way)
source pollution. Unfortunately, the "overhauled" CWA offers no
new recipe for success.
To their credit, some members of Congress did try. The key to
effective agricultural pollution control lies in linking the massive
more than 250,000 people have a permit by 1991, and to be in compliance within three
years of receiving the permit. Id. § 405 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(A)).
98. Id. § 405 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1242(p)(4)(B)).
99. The Water Quality Act of 1987 provides federal grants and subsidies of up to
60% of the cost of state nonpoint management programs. Id. § 319 (to be codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1329(h)(3)). These programs must be approved by the EPA. Approval hinges
upon identification of the following: navigable waters which cannot maintain water
quality standards without nonpoint source control, categories of nonpoint sources, and
the best management practices and measures to control each category. Id. § 319 (to be
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)).
100. JWater Quality, supra note 85, at 1832
101. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1982). Subsection (f) provides federal grants for areawide
planning to control nonpoint waste.
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federal assistance and subsidies offered to the American farmer with
sound conservation practices. Linkage of this sort provides suitable
conditions to effectuate federal policies and is commonplace in vir-
tually every federal assistance program, including employment, civil
rights, and environmental protection. 0 2 Proposals to link farm sub-
sidies with conservation in the 1987 amendments, however, met
with protests from the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Na-
tional Cattlemen's Association, the Texas Soil and Water Conserva-
tion Board, and perhaps most fatally, from Senator Lloyd Bentson
(D-Texas), who stated that the 1987 amendments would be "killed"
if "cross-compliance" language were involved.' The language was
dropped in committee.'0 4
We are now running out of choices. There is no reason to ex-
pect a farm state to curb its constituents in order to benefit a distant
estuary. There is hardly more reason to expect even a coastal state,
where the coastal impacts are most directly felt, to impose these
curbs on its own farmers, given the rural influence on state legisla-
tures. "Voluntary" state programs hold about the same promise as
voluntary abstinence by real estate developers, which leaves two op-
tions: the imposition of more mandatory state programs, or the use
of federal "cross-compliance." When it comes to state programs
and the marginal economic benefits of winter plowing, of draining a
few more potholes, and of putting a. little more shelterbelt into culti-
vation, the state can either forbid these practices outright (which is
all but unimaginable) or attempt to reduce them by tax or other
blandishments (a solution that will be both costly and sporadic)." 5
102. Houck, This Side of Heresy: Conditioning Louisiana's Ten-Year Industrial Tax Exemption
upon Compliance with Environmental Laws, 61 TUL. L. REV. 289, 348 (1986). The first such
statute was the Buy American Act of 1933 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1982)). Id. at
348 n.327.
103. Bentsen, Durenburger, Others Disagree over Requirements for Non-point Sources, [Current
Developments) Env't Rep. (BNA) 431 (July 22, 1983).
104. Id.
105. Federal tax incentives, similar to those offered to industry for point source pollu-
tion control equipment, could encourage more widespread reduction. The "sodbuster'"
provisions of the new farm bill provide direct payments for practices that will reduce
nonpoint pollution, so long as these payments continue. The Food Security Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-198. §§ 1211-1213, 99 Stat. 1506-07 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3811-3813)). See generally ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
SWAMPBUSTING: WETLAND CONVERSION AND FARM PROGRAMS (Aug. 1986) (noting that
without federal price supports and tax incentives, conversion of wetlands to agriculture
is, in most cases, unprofitable). Part of the cost of these programs is in their duration.
An incentive to adopt an industrial technology has a fixed life, after which the technol-
ogy is maintained by the industrial source. Incentives for nonpoint practices, on the
other hand, represent a continuing and unpredictable outlay; when the market changes
or the money stops flowing, the deal may end. With regard to the Conservation Reserve
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While the EPA now has the means to encourage state programs, it
has little means to mandate effective ones, because other federal
agencies are at the same time encouraging farmers, through the use
of almost $20 billion in price supports10 6 and nearly a billion more
in other assistance programs, 0 7 to drain, clear, fall plow, and apply
chemical fertilizer and pesticides.
The 1987 amendments may be worse than no response at all to
the agricultural pollution problem, for, while offering the illusion of
a remedy, they in fact offer a program that has failed once before
and contains no new ingredients. It is better to acknowledge that
the problem has yet to be addressed. The most effective leverage
on farm practices is federal farm assistance and farm subsidies. Un-
til we are ready to accept this conclusion and implement it, farm
pollution will continue to degrade rivers and their estuaries.
B. Municipal Sewage Treatment
The nation's sewage treatment plants remove about 13,600 tons a day of
two principal pollutants, an improvement of 65 percent over 1973 levels. It
[EPA] attributed this reduction to construction grants to state and local gov-
ernments aimed at enhanced treatment levels of municipal waste water.
Although the population served by municipal treatment plants has in-
creased by 18 million people in the past 10 years, and municipal waste water
flow has risen 7 billion gallons a day, the E.P.A. said, "The total amount of
pollutants entering the nation's waters from these plants stayed roughly constant."Id
This is a rather shocking conclusion. Even with the billions of
dollars invested over the past fifteen years in the construction of
municipal sewage treatment works,' 0 9 we are barely holding our
program, conservationists are reported to be worried about "what will happen ... once
the program's 10-year contracts run out, especially if world food prices recover by then
and make 'fence row to fence row' planting profitable again." Conservation Reserve Program
Half Full, LAND LE'TTER, Oct. I, 1987, at 8.
106. DOMESTIC POLICY ALTERNATIVES TASK FORCE, NAT'L AGRICUL.TURAL FORUM, AL-
TERNATIVES FOR U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY 72-74 (Dec. 1984). In 1983 the
federal government paid out $28.3 billion in farm-price- and income-support programs
and in-kind commodities. Id. at 72.
107. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva-
tion Service was budgeted for $215.2 million, and the Soil Conservation Service's
budget totalled $675.1 million in 1986. Reagan's 1988 Natural Resources Stresses Recisions,
User Fees, Cuts in Land Acquisition, LAND LETTER, Jan. 15, 1987, at 2.
108. E.P.A. Finds Significant Progress in Controlling Pollution of I Vater, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,
1984, § I, at 31, col. I (emphasis added).
109. The federal government has spent more than $40 billion in the past 15 years for
the construction of municipal treatment systems. OTA, supra note II, at 209. The fed-
eral monies are provided under §§ 201-210 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1299 (1982
& Supp. 111 1985). This figure does not include state and local expenditures, which
would nearly double the bill.
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own. The effects of treatment are simply offset by the number of
new subdivisions, new office complexes, and new dischargers that
tie into the treatment plants." We are like a dog chasing our tail.
Worse, the chase cannot continue indefinitely. The 1987
amendments signal the end of federal assistance for sewage treat-
ment construction."' In a few years the federal monies will be
gone, and it will be up to the states and local governments to con-
struct and maintain publicly owned treatment works (POTWs)." 2
Maintenance over the long term may prove to be the more formida-
ble hurdle. And the newly constructed plants are operating at little
more than 50 percent efficiency." 13 And at the end of the most effi-
cient of operations, we are left with sludge, mountains of sludge,
over ten million dry metric tons by the year 2000.' "'
The federal leverage over sewer dischargers that are not in
compliance is quite limited. To its credit, the federal government
has begun an enforcement campaign against major municipal viola-
110. The size of the problem has been summarized by the Office of Technology As-
sessment as follows:
Over 15,000 POTWs currently operate in the United States and each year
they treat and discharge approximately 9.5 trillion gallons of wastewater. More
than 2,200 POTWs are located in coastal counties, and they discharge about
one-third of the Nation's municipal effluent. POTWs also produce increasing
amounts of sewage sludge. The total amount generated by all POTWs more
than doubled during the last decade, and almost 40 percent originates from
POTWs located in coastal counties.
By the year 2000, total sludge production could increase to over 10 million
dry metric tons. The amount of effluent is expected to increase to between 13
and 16 trillion gallons per year. These increases will result from expanded use
of secondary and advanced treatment processes, which produce more sludge,
and increases in population, sewerage hookups, and numbers of POTWs.
OTA, supra note I1, at 217.
Ill. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-4, §§ 211,607, 101 Stat. 7, 21,26-28 (to
be codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1287, 1387).
112. The federal monies are to be terminated with grants totalling $9.6 billion
through fiscal year 1990, at which time an additional $8.4 billion is appropriated to es-
tablish state-run, low-interest revolving loan programs. Id. This money is, of course, no
longer "free" to local communities who will hencelorth shoulder the entire burden to
construct new facilities and maintain the current ones.
113. Based on a survey of 531 randomly selected major dischargers in 6 states, the
General Accounting Office estimated that 82% of the dischargers exceeded their permit
limits at least once during an 18 month period and that 31% of the dischargers that
exceeded permit limits for one or more pollutants did so by 50% or more for at least 4
consecutive months. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATION,
UNDERWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH EPA POLLUTION CONTROL PER-
MITS, at i-iii (Dec. 2, 1983).
114. For an overview of the management of dredged material, see OTA, supra note
1I. at 237.
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tors. ' 5 Fines against these violators are assessed with increasing
frequency,"' but there are limits to what can be wrung from hard-
pressed municipal budgets. Moreover, while an industrial discharge
can be enjoined, no one has seriously proposed shutting down a
POTW." 7 .From time to time, a caring government and a daring
court may undertake to replace a noncomplying POTW manage-
ment with an appointed receivership."' 8 The success of the receiv-
ership will depend, however, on funding that will be, as it wears out,
increasingly difficult to obtain and technology that will be increas-
ingly costly to maintain. Thus, we are locked into a program of
hardware that in the best of circumstances has maintained a semi-
polluted status quo. Furthermore, we lack the means to ensure even
these results.
The impact of inadequate sewage treatment on estuarine re-
sources' ' 9 is perhaps even more dramatic than that of agricultural
or industrial sources.' 20 Fecal coliform alone has shut down Louisi-
ana's oyster beds.' 2 ' The same goes for shellfishing in Washing-
ton's Puget Sound,' 22 and it may even be true for the shellfish
harvests of Massachusetts and the Chesapeake Bay. Once again,
from a coastal standpoint, we need a better answer.
One way is to return to first principles. When one stops to con-
sider it, the idea of using water resources--on whose purity our
health and that of other animals depend-to flush away and absorb
human wastes is a little barbaric. One of the earliest taboos of the
115. See EPA Memorandum Reviewing Suits Filed Against Cities to Enforce National Municipal
Polic- under Clean Water Act, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1214 (Nov. I,
1985).
116. The most massive fine to date has been assessed against the Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Authority in the order of $32,032,600. United States v. Puerto
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 25 E.R.C. 1921 (D.P.R. 1987).
117. See Montgomery Envtl. Coalition, Inc. v. EPA, 19 E.R.C. 1169, 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1983) ("[Petitioners' interpretation of the Act ignores the fact that municipal sewage
treatment plants simply cannot be shut down for violations of the Act; countervailing
considerations of public health require that treatment facilities continue to operate.").
118. See Court-Created Receivership Emerging as Remedy for Persistent Noncompliance with En-
vironmental Laws, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10059 (Mar. 1980); see also United
States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (court appointed the Mayor
of Detroit as administrator of the city wastewater system and granted him powers tradi-
tionally exercised by court-appointed receivers).
119. For a summary of sewage effluent and sludge impacts on estuarine areas, see
OTA. supra note 11, at 223.
120. For a discussion of the major sources of pollutants to marine waters, see OTA,
supra note II, at 66-72.
12 1. See Sewage pollution closes prime oyster beds, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Dec. 6,
1983. § 1, at 13, col. 1.
122. See Coastal Degradation, supra note 14, at 1585-86.
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most primitive societies was that one did not foul the water. The
idea of polluting our water with our wastes is defended by four ra-
tionalizations: (1) the water can take it; (2) it is cheap; (3) we have
always done it this way; and (4) it is too late to change.
The evidence now shows, however, that the water cannot "take
it." Not in the amounts now offered. There is also mounting evi-
dence that it is far from "cheap," either in terms of continued con-
struction and maintenance, or in the cost to "externalities" such as
oysters, crabs, and the commercial harvest of the coastal zone. Fur-
thermore, from an historical standpoint, we have not "always done
it this way." For most of our history these wastes have been dis-
posed of on land. Thus, we are left with the question of whether it is
"too late to change."
Looking objectively into the next century, it is too early to tell
when the costs for new sewage treatment works will catch up with
expanding municipalities. When the bills for maintaining this infra-
structure of hardware also come due-as they are now for maintain-
ing the analogous federal aid system for bridges and highways-
they will prove ruinous. When the costs for the safe disposal of the
produced sludges are added-as they now will be under the 1987
CWA Amendments-they will in no way lighten the burden.' In
retrospect, perhaps the largest and best intentioned mistake of the
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 was the section 201
funding for municipal sewage treatment. At enormous cost, it of-
fered the illusion of a solution, and it forestalled sensible and more
enduring policy changes. If the objective is to take municipal sew-
age out of the water, then, over the long term, the most sensible
system would not put it into the water in the first place.
This is not to argue for a return to the slop pot and the honey
bucket. Nor need we dump our wastes, once again, into city streets
and gutters. Alternative systems for collecting and treating human
wastes have been on the market for decades.'24 They have been de-
feated, as a commercial enterprise, by the relative convenience of a
123. The 1987 Amendments call for the analysis and treatment of polluted sludges.
The Water Quality Act of 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 406, 101 Stat. 7, 71 (1987) (to be
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1345).
124. See OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAM OPERATIONS & OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEv.,
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INNOVATIVE AND ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT MANUAL A-248 to -249 (Feb. 1980) (and sources cited therein). Although
these systems are available in a technological sense, they have been dwarfed and de-
feated in the marketplace by the enormous federal subsidies supplied to central munici-
pal systems. Two billion dollars a year in federal construction funds is stiff competition
indeed. Sadly. telephone calls to municipal wastewater engineers, state agencies, and
the EPA during the month of December 1987 revealed that central systems based on
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waterborne system that has been supported by billions in federal
subsidies and that has ignored the external costs of its partially and
imperfectly treated wastes.' 25 Federal funding could have been far
more effectively applied toward pollution control by developing and
commercializing alternative systems. It still can be.
It is, of course, "too late" to undo the construction of the past
fifteen years, and it would be inefficient to abandon it. But there is
no need to perpetuate it. Sooner or later, we will have to recognize
the need for an approach that treats sewage as a resource to be re-
claimed, rather than a waste to be conveyed by, and dissolved into,
water.
C. Pretreatment
Over one trillion gallons of wastewater containing RCRA hazardous
wastes are discharged annually into municipal sewers by some 160,000 in-
dustrial facilities. Without any treatment at industrial facilities, these dis-
charges would contain at least 160,000 metric tons of hazardous
components-including 62,000 metric tons of priority metals, roughly
40,000 metric tons of priority organic chemicals, and at least 64,000 metric
tons of non-priority organic chemicals.
t 2 6
The preceding discussion notwithstanding, it is a fair bet that
we will continue to live with the illogic of first putting human wastes
into our water and then building ever more expensive plants to take
them out. Were human wastes all that these plants had to treat, one
could still clutch at a straw of hope. We might not improve things,
but with enough money, we could hold our own. Unfortunately, we
have instead designed a system (if it can be called that) that dis-
charges industrial wastes and toxics in staggering amounts into
POTWs, which, in turn, pass them on in staggering amounts to our
waterborne sewage (and subsequent discharges) are currently the unchallenged premise
of the sewage treatment field.
125. As one state assistant attorney general recalls:
When I was involved in waste water treatment issues some years ago, the
situation was that the appropriate technology people .. .had written large
chunks of the clean water law but had not gotten control of the funding under
the law. So EPA kept saying wonderful things about alternative technology and
handing out money for the conventional steel and concrete approach. And
when they found out that there was no such thing as enough money to do the
job that way, they responded by relaxing the standards rather than by simply
paying attention to the law concerning appropriate technology.
Letter from Richard M. Troy, Assistant Attorney General. Louisiana Dep't ofJustice, to
Oliver A. Houck (Mar. 22, 1985) (on file with the author).
126. OTA. supra note I L,.at 212. For a general description of the pretreatment pro-
gram under the CWA, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL
RIF.;tI.ATIONS AND IECHNOLOGY. THE NATIONAL PRETREATMENT PROGRAM (July 1986)
1hereinaliter PRETREATM ENT1.
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coastal estuaries. The system, called "industrial pretreatment," may
be the most unworkable aspect of an already troubled clean water
program.
Pretreatment is one of those efficiency-based concepts that
sounds plausible in a course in "Economics and the Environment."
It is unnecessary to require industry to remove wastes and sewage
that the local municipal plant is going to be treating anyway. Effi-
ciencies of scale should allow industries to discharge their wastes
into municipal systems with a credit for the municipal treatment.
27
Congress, which bought this argument from the start, has directed
the EPA to develop separate "pretreatment" standards for indus-
trial discharges into POTWs.' 28 The standards are of two types:
(1) "categorical" standards for a limited number of industries and
for a somewhat larger number of toxics;' 2 9 and (2) general stan-
dards that, in essence, prohibit the introduction of substances that
would harm the POTW system itself.'3 ° The standards are imple-
mented not by the EPA or the states, but by participating POTWs
themselves.'' The federal standards have been a nightmare to de-
velop. Local implementation is approaching, even at this late date, a
state of chaos.
The EPA has labored at length on pretreatment standards. Fif-
teen years after the passage of the CWA, with litigation at every
turn, 3 2 the Agency has finally promulgated for twenty-seven indus-
tries categorical standards which regulate (but, of course, do not
prohibit) the discharge of one hundred twenty-six toxic sub-
stances.' 33 The first shortcoming is obvious: any unlisted industries
and toxics; which include a wide range of nasty substances,' 34 are
essentially uncovered." 3 ' Also, after considerable trial and error, as
127. See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.14, at 477-81 (1977). "Joint treatment
at a single facility offers substantial advantages-more dependable flow rates, economies
of scale, better use of manpower and land, more efficient disposal of sludges." Id. at
481.
128. 33 U.S.C. §§ 13 14(g), 1317(b)-(c) (1982).
129. "Categorical" standards have been issued for 27 industries, covering 126 toxic
pollutants. PRETREATMENT, supra note 126, at 17-18.
130. Id. at 15.
131. For the overall framework of enforcement authority, see id. at 10-I l.
132. E.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289 (3d Cir.
1986); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116
(1985); CPC Int'l v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 430 U.S. 966
(1977).
133. See supra note 129.
134. See PRETREATMENT, supra note 126. at 4.
135. Industry. seizing upon this loophole, is apparently changing its processes to
avoid regulation. Preliminary Tests Show ToxicitV Problems in Sewage Treatment Plant Effluent,
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well as judicial review, the EPA has promulgated its "prohibited"
standards designed to prevent "interference" with POTW sys-
tems.' 36 The basic shortcoming of this approach is that a POTW
will rarely be able to locate the sources of "interference" (i.e., who is
putting what into its system and causing what impact). The POTW
system is treated, in effect, as a receiving basin. Abatement of these
effects is subject to the same kind of "I'm not the one who is causing
the problem" arguments and difficulties of proof that plagued the
pre-1972 efforts at water pollution control.
3 7
Notwithstanding the difficulties with the standards noted above,
their implementation presents an even larger problem. First, only
major POTWs, which are defined as POTWs with a daily flow of
more than five million gallons and others with significant industrial
inputs, are required to have pretreatment programs. '38 Thus, of the
more than 15,000 POTWs in the United States only about 1,500
have pretreatment programs, which receive an estimated 82 percent
of the total industrial wastewater entering POTWs.' 3 9 The remain-
ing 18 percent escape the program and any pretreatment at all. Ad-
ding to this loophole is the fact that implementation of the program
is left to the local POTW, whose responsibility it is to identify the
industries that are discharging wastewater into its system, to permit
those discharges, and to monitor compliance.' 4 ° Needless to say,
even if the purpose of a national discharge program were to offset
the political pressures placed on states to relax their programs,"'
those same pressures are even more formidable at the local level, 1
42
producing a wide variety of standards and levels of compliance
EPA Says, Env't Rep. (BNA) 850 (Sept. 13, 1985). See also Supreme Court Declines to Hear
Second Case Involving Citizen Suits for Past Violations, Env't Rep. (BNA) 1829-30 (Dec. 11,
1987) (a citizen suit against CIBA-Geigy Corp. was dismissed as moot because "the com-
pany had tied into a local sewage treatment plant").
136. General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources, 52 Fed. Reg.
1586 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 403.3, 403.5).
137. See infro note 160 and accompanying text.
138. 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(a) (1987).
139. OTA, supra note II, at 183.
140. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(0 (1987). The EPA has provided elaborate guidance for
local POTWs. See OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT AND PERMITS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR POTW PRETREATMENT PROGRAM DEVELOP-
MENT (Oct. 1983).
141. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
142. For one example of local pressures working to frustrate a pretreatment program,
see DPII" gears up for waste pre-treatment program, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge), Feb.
16, 1985, at B-I, col. I [hereinafter DPVJ; Businessmen sue to block program, Morning Advo-
cate (Baton Rouge), May 14, 1987, at B-I, col. I [hereinafter Businessmen]. Baton Rouge,
a heavily industrialized city, sent out its first questionnaires to determine who was put-
ting what into the local municipal system 13 years after the passage of the CWA. DPM,
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among the local municipal systems.' 43 The only federal monitoring
requirements for categorical industries and their discharges to local
systems are a semi-annual report on these discharges"' and notifica-
tion of any additional loads that would interfere with the POTW.
45
The EPA guidance manual also recommends random sampling of
industrial effluent and on-site inspections, but these recommenda-
tions are not mandatory.' 4 6
At the end of the treatment process, the POTWs are left with a
mountain of sludge that has been rendered useless, indeed hazard-
ous, by the introduction of industrial wastes.' 47 These contami-
nants prevent the most obvious and beneficial uses of sewage
sludges, while creating considerable pressure for other disposal
methods such as incineration and ocean dumping' 48 that produce
additional environmental hazards. Of course, those toxics that are
not "treated" and retained in the sludge are passed through to the
receiving waters which turn out to be, in large part, the Nation's
estuaries. No less than 37 percent of the toxics entering our Na-
tion's waters and estuaries pass from industries through POTWs.' 4 9
Virtually every review of the pretreatment program has rated it
a failure. A 1980 Oversight Subcommittee report to the House Pub-
lic Works Committee concluded that "[a]fter eight years of trying,
EPA has been almost totally unsuccessful in implementing this re-
quirement of the law." 5 ' The hearings left the subcommittee "with
considerable doubt" about the workability of the program."' A
1982 report by the General Accounting Office found the program
"undefined," resulting in "costly, inequitable and/or redundant
supra at B-I. As soon as local requirements began to be enforced, local businessmen
sued, charging that the rules were unconstitutional. Businessmen, supra at B-1.
143. For a discussion of a compliance study for 1600 major facilities, see OTA, supra
note II, at 199.
144. 40 C.F.R. § 403.12(e) (1987).
145. Id. § 403.12(0.
146. See OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT AND PERMITS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, PRETREATMENT COMPLIANCE MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 2-
II, 3-18 (Sept. 1986).
147. See generally OTA, supra note I1, at 209-23 (management of municipal effluent
and sludge).
148. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Ruckelshaus, 21 E.R.C. 1776 (D.N.J. 1983) (dis-
missing citizen group suit to stop sewage waste dumping in an area in the New York
Bight Apex on ground that EPA's duty to enforce pretreatment standards is discretion-
ary and outside the scope of the CWA's citizen suit provisions); City of New York v. EPA,
543 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that City of New York dumps 260 dry
tons of sewage each day into the Bight Apex).
149. PRETREATMENT, supra note 126, at 4.
150. See Congress to Review Clean Water Legislation, CONG. Q., Jan. 23, 1982. at 124.
151'. Id.
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treatment that may not address toxic pollution problems" and,
would "drain . . . scarce Federal, State and local pollution control
resources."'5 2 A 1987 Office of Technology Assessment report
identified major, continuing shortcomings with the pretreatment
program, none of them susceptible to any easy solution.'
These findings speak for themselves. In 1987 Congress struck a
glancing blow at the pretreatment program from the opposite end-
the sludges. The EPA now must identify the toxics present in sew-
age sludge and specify numerical limits for them. 15 4 The burden
apparently will remain on the POTW, however, to work a reduction
in toxic inputs from the sources. I wish them well. I am not holding
my breath. '55
There comes a time in The Emperor's New Clothes when a village
boy points out that the emperor, in fact, is not wearing any clothes
at all. That boy was taking a fresh look. Similarly, it is difficult for us
to take a fresh look at pretreatment and municipal treatment as a
whole. Even the staunchest defender of the municipal treatment
program, however, has to blanch at the introduction of industrial
pollution into its municipal sewer systems. Even the most vigorous
defender of federalism has to blush at a program that turns the re-
152. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, A NEW APPROACH Is NEEDED FOR THE FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL
WASTEWATER PRETREATMENT PROGRAM I (Feb. 19, 1982).
153. The report found that: (1) while BAT standards for organic chemicals were
achieving more than a 99% removal for direct discharges, pretreatment standards were
achieving only a 4% removal rate; (2) some entire categories of toxic industrial dis-
charges, including car washes and commercial laundries, were exempted from pretreat-
ment standards, while standards have simply never been promulgated for others, such as
textile mills and oil plastics moulding, (approximately 91,000 laundries dislodge 526
million gallons a day into POTWs, containing at least 13 priority, i.e., toxic pollutants);
(3) about 30% of the priority pollutants now entering POTWs originate from noncat-
egorical sources; (4) a 1984 survey of electroplating firms revealed that 22% had not
submitted monitoring reports and of those which were submitted, only 54% were in
compliance with categorical pretreatment standards; and (5) at least 102 of the 126 CWA
priority pollutants had been found in POTW influents, including both toxic pollutants
(e.g., chlorinated solvents, aromatic hydrocarbons) and hazardous substances (e.g., xy-
lene, methyl ethyl ketone). OTA, supra note 1I, at 188!199, 212.
154. The Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 406(a), 101 Stat. 7, 71
(1987) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1345); see generally The Water Quality Act of 1987: A
Major Step in Assuring the Quality of the Nation's Waters, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10311 (Aug. 1987) (overview and analysis of the Water Quality Act of 1987).
155. The EPA, while not quite holding its breath, is talking sternly to POTWs. The
Deputy Assistant for Water is paraphrased as telling the 60th Annual Conference of the
Water Pollution Control Federation that "unless regulators move ahead" on toxics,
Congress "will return to a technology-based approach the next time it renews the Water
Act." Toxic Pollution Must Be Stemmed Soon, or Congress Will React, EPA Official Warns, [Cur-
rent Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1562 (Oct. 16, 1987).
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sponsibility for regulating nearly half of the toxic pollution dis-
charged in this country over to 15,000 disparate, local POTWs.
Notwithstanding the notions of "efficiency" that motivated this pro-
gram, it has produced one set of categorical standards for those in-
dustries that discharge into POTWs, another set for those that do
not, and an entirely new bureaucracy to implement and enforce
these standards. In the name of "efficiency" we have doubled the
number of pollution standards, multiplied the number of regulatory
agencies by about a hundredfold, and managed, in the end, to so
poison our sewage sludges that they have become, in reality, hazard-
ous wastes.
As was once said of the American involvement in Vietnam, it is
time to declare this program a victory and get out.
D. Water Quality Upgrading
[Elven the weariest river [wlinds somewhere safe to sea.
1 5 6
According to the Office of Technology Assessment, 1,300 ma-
jor industries and 600 municipal treatment plants discharge into riv-
ers that flow into coastal waters. These numbers are probably
conservative. Few rivers do not flow to the sea. To be sure, these
rivers do their share of aerating, purifying, and detoxifying-the
"free work" that, to some, legitimizes the concept of discharging
pollutants into water. Discharges in Des Moines, St. Louis, and the
central states are purified, for the most part, before they reach the
Gulf of Mexico. Even the toxic metals in these discharges have been
"scrubbed" out by solid particles in the water column and lie strewn
in the sediment along the way. Many are trapped behind the dams
that line such rivers as the Columbia, the Snake, the Sacramento,
the Missouri, the Savannah, the Trinity, and the Connecticut. The
major municipal and industrial concentrations lie below these dams,
however, at the base of the rivers, where they meet the sea. This is
where the most pollution occurs. Here, the "flushing" action of run-
ning water is at its weakest, and the thesis of "free work" breaks
down. Even the mighty Mississippi River has difficulty assimilating
the effluent from the 175 facilities and 1.5 million people on its last
leg to the Gulf.' 5 7 The same can be said for the Hudson River at
New York City, the Delaware River at Wilmington, and many others.
156. Swinburne, The Garden of Prosperpine, in VIcTORIAN POETRY 699 (E.K. Sutherland
ed. 1942).
157. INVENTORY REPORT, supra note 90, at 27. There are over 350 industrial and mu-
nicipal facilities discharging into the lower Mississippi from St. Francesville to Venice.
Id.
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With industrial sources at BAT, sewage treatment chasing its
tail, urban runoff controls ten years into the future (if then), and
agricultural discharges firmly out of control, where do we go from
here?
The CWA has provided the same answers for conventional and
toxic pollutants: we upgrade based on state water quality standards.
Sections 1311, 1312, and 1313 require, in their aggregate, that
states identify both the waters that remain below designated criteria
(generally based on the extent to which they kill aquatic organisms)
and the sources of the pollution that cause these continuing
problems. In addition, the states must allocate "total maximum
daily loads" for these sources and incorporate these allocations into
revised discharge permits.' The intended result is the abatement
of pollution.
In theory and practice, this concept has rarely worked. Indeed,
in 1972, after sixteen years of no progress, Congress rejected this
very concept and adopted another, founded on technology-based
standards.' 59 In so doing, Congress pointed out why the concept
had failed. Among the reasons given were the almost insurmounta-
ble difficulties in determining: (1) the desired "use" of a stream,
which would determine its water quality, given the competing desire
to attract industrial growth; (2) the actual water quality of a stream
in all of its constituents; (3) the effects of a single discharge, as well
as the cumulative and synergistic effects of multiple discharges, on
this water quality; (4) the cause of any particular drop in water qual-
ity; and (5) an appropriate "allocation" of reductions among diverse
causes, each of whom is legitimately pointing the finger at some-
body else.'4 '0 Why, then, did Congress retain a water-quality-based
process? Perhaps, because in 1972, Congress was under the impres-
sion that BAT would largely solve the pollution control problem.
158. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1313 (1982). Section 1313(d)(l)(C) requires each state to es-
tablish the total maximum daily load (TMDL) of particular pollutants for a limited body
of water, and accept and attain the applicable water quality standard. Section 1313(d)(2)
allows the Administrator to set the TMDL upon disapproving the state's standard. Sec-
tion 1311(b) requires that BAT permits be revised, at which time the TMDL is to be
taken into account. Section 1312(a) allows the EPA to upgrade effluent limitations
which interfere with attaining or maintaining a water quality in a specific body of water.
This new limitation must compare the economic and social costs of achieving these limi-
tations to the social and economic benefits to be attained.
159. See PRETREATMENT, supra note 126, at 15.
160. See EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 203-09 (1976) (reviewing the difficulties un-
derlying water pollution legislation); F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 73, 74 (3d ed. 1985)
(noting difficulties in identifying ambient water quality, pollution, effects, and sources);
see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (detailing economic
factors to be considered under EPA variance clause).
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Water quality upgrading would remain as a backup system for those
rare exceptions in which water required it. Whatever the reason,
the exceptions have swallowed the rule. Nonpoint pollution grows,
sewage treatment barely holds its own, and even industrial BAT has
proven to be less stringent than anticipated-indeed, it is often little
more stringent than :the interim 1977 standard of best practicable
technology (BPT)' 6 1-all of which puts more pressure on water
quality upgrading to do the job. The estuaries have been left with a
safety net that in the past, for excellent reasons, has caught nothing
at all. In Louisiana, with almost one-fifth of its water areas identified
as "water quality limited" (i.e., polluted), 6 ' water quality upgrading
has yet to lead to the revision of a single NPDES permit.' 6
In 1987 the Congress amended the CWA to address, among
other things, the barely touched topic of toxic discharges."6 In so
doing, it adopted an approach based on water quality standards and
receiving water quality.' 65 States are now told to adopt toxic water
quality criteria, "identify" toxic-limited waters, and allocate load-
ings-an all too familiar game. In effect, this program, having failed
miserably from the 1950s to 1972 for even such easily identified pol-
lutants as total suspended solids, and having been virtually inactive
from 1972 to 1987, is now the front line for the most obviously seri-
ous pollutants. As a practical matter, given the demands on already
limited state water pollution control programs, this new offensive on
toxics will most likely preempt state efforts under section 1313-the
contemplated "safety net" for the more conventional pollutants,
such as biological oxygen demand and fecal coliforms, which are
161. New BAT Standard: Lowering the Ceiling or Raising the Floor?, 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10002 (Jan. 1983).
162. "Of the 133 designated segments, 25 are water quality limited and 108 are efflu-
ent limited." INVENTORY REPORT, supra note 90, at 14.
163. Personal communication with Dale Givens, Assistant Administrator for Water
Quality, Louisiana Dep't of Environmental Quality (Oct. 1987). For the practical diffi-
culties in upgrading even a single water segment, see LOUISIANA DEPT OF ENVTL. QUAL-
ITY, WASTE LOAD ALLOCATION FOR THE VERMILLION RIVER (Mar. 1987) (also containing a
90-page study and water quality assessment with a 102 -page appendix of yet more
surveys and data).
164. A 1985 study by Greenpeace reported that more than one ton of toxic pollutants
are discharged into Boston Harbor daily, with an additional 100 to 1000 tons leaking
into the harbor every day from nonpoint sources such as leaking landfills. See The Clean
Water Act Amendments of 1987-A BVA Special Report (Part II), (Monographs) Env't Rep.
(BNA) 42 (Sept. 4, 1987) [hereinafter BNA Special Report].
165. Section 308(d) of the Water Quality Act of 1987 requires a state to adopt water
quality criteria for all toxic pollutants listed in 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1982). Water
Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 308(d), 101 Stat. 7, 39 (1987) (to be codified at
33 U.S.C. § 133(c)(2)(B)). The criteria should be set to support the designated use of
the body of water. Id.
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having a field day at the coast. The EPA's Deputy Administrator for
Water has frankly acknowledged that the new Act "speak[s] to the
states" and is "generally-speaking, a water-quality based law." '166
By way of both explanation and defense, she went on to state that
the water-quality-based approach, although problematic in the past,
now has a better chance to succeed:
-Before the 1972 law, she said, you'd get into these
long, long debates with dischargers who would say, 'No, let
me prove to you this isn't a problem.' So I guess my feel-
ing is that having established a very strong nationwide en-
forcement structure, we have got a tool that will allow us
not to get lost in endless scientific debates.
Secondly, we've learned something in the last 20 years.
Our monitoring technology is much better than it was 20
years ago .... So we've got a lot of information we didn't
have 20 years ago. So the combination of the much better
information and the much better permitting and enforce-
ment base means that I think we have a chance we didn't
have then. 16 7
This author remains unconvinced. We have seen nothing but
"endless scientific debates" over every sensitive pollution abate-
ment issue from acid rain to vinyl chloride. There is no reason to
believe that our science is even near the threshold of being disposi-
tive,' 68 or that states are now more willing to present a stringent and
uniform front against pollution than they were in the 1960s when, in
many cases, their economies were in much better condition. At bot-
tom, the 1987 CWA Amendments are not scientific but ideological.
This ideology is "no treatment for treatment's sake" (we only need
to clean up pollution that hurts water quality) and "leave govern-
ment to the states." This ideology may be good politics. As history
shows, it is no strategy for pollution control.
All of which leaves the estuaries with little hope from this quar-
ter for improvements in water quality. If a system of upgrading is to
be effective, it will need considerably more muscle.
166. See BNA Special Report, supra note 164, at 4.
167. Id.
168. A recent proposal to discharge 12 million tons of gypsum waste into the Missis-
sippi River brought out batteries of testimony on environmental and human health ef-
fects that was so conflicting, with respect to every pollutant, that it disposed of nothing.
For a summary of the Gypsum Task Force studies and the EPA's response to them, see
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY-REGION 6, PUBLIC NOTICE OF FINAL PERMIT
DECISION, ADVERTISING ORDER No. 7T-3285-NNLX (Aug. 5, 1987).
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1. The National Estuary Program: More Old Wine.-Recognizing
the limitations of its existing approaches to estuarine pollution, in
1987 Congress seized upon initiatives that the EPA had recently'
launched under its pre-1987 authority 6 9 and elevated them into a
"National Estuary Program."' 7 0 The Program calls for the conven-
ing of "management conferences"--each of which is to last,
hearteningly, no longer than five years-that will lead to pollution
abatement plans for estuaries of national significance.' 7 ' Addition-
ally, specific authorizations are provided for the Great Lakes and the
Chesapeake Bay.' 72 Of perhaps passing note, no special authoriza-
tion is made for the Louisiana coastal zone; indeed, no part of the
Louisiana coastline-one-quarter of the Nation's coastal wetlands,
and the most rapidly disappearing-is designated for "priority
consideration."173
The mechanism of these plans is a familiar one. Water quality
problems are to be identified, traced back to their sources, and rem-
edied by additional controls established by the participating
states. 74 And so we have the "water quality upgrading" mechanism
in estuarine dress. This process is to be encouraged by federal
funding for both the conferences and the management plans-a to-
tal of $12 million over the next five years.' 7 5 How such a system,
which has proven unworkable even for discrete rivers and identifi-
able watersheds, will now, under a new label, prove effective for
cleaning up the myriad of nonpoint industrial and municipal dis-
charges that interact to degrade estuaries of all sizes is left unex-
plained by the 1987 CWA Amendments and their legislative history.
169. Under the authority of 33 U.S.C. § 1254(n) (1982), the EPA had launched an
estuarine initiative based on regional management of water quality. See Towards a Va-
tional Coastal Policy, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10404, 10406 (Oct. 1987) [herein-
after Coastal Policy].
170. The Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 320, 101 Stat. 7, 61-65
(1987) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1330).
17 1. See id. § 320(a)(2)(A) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1330(a)(2)(A)) (requiring the
"Management Conferences" to control point and nonpoint sources which pollute estua-
ries of "national significance'); id. § 320(e) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1330(e)) (re-
quiring that these conferences last not more than five years).
172. See id. § 117 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1267) (addressing the Chesapeake
Bay); id. § 118 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1268) (addressing the Great Lakes).
173. See id. § 320(a)(2)(B) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1330(a)(2)(B)) (establishing
"priority consideration" for Long Island Sound, New York, and Connecticut; Narragan-
sett Bay, Rhode Island; Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts; Puget Sound, Washington; New
York-New Jersey Harbor, New York and New Jersey; Delaware Bay, Delaware and New
Jersey; Delaware Inland Bays, Delaware; Albemarle Sound, North Carolina; Sarasota
Bay, Florida; San Francisco Bay, California; and Galveston Bay, Texas).
174. Id. § 317(b) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b)).
175. Id. § 317(i) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1330(i)).
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Indeed, it was the failure of ten years of federally funded "enforce-
ment conferences" under the old Water Pollution Control Act that
led Congress to scrap the "conference" approach 76 and adopt
technology standards and citizen suit enforcement instead.' 77 That
history notwithstanding, we have now authorized a coastal version
of all that has not succeeded earlier.
This author's crystal ball predicts that the National Estuary Pro-
gram will serve the limited purpose of bringing states together to
talk about the pollution of their common estuaries. When these
states are in earnest the Program will produce results.' 78 For these
states, however, the Program is the least necessary. Sadly, most pol-
luted estuaries lie within the borders of a single state and their rem-
edy will require more than another round of conferences.
2. Impetus from the Courts: A "Taking" Action?-One suggested
way to encourage the cleanup of estuaries is to enfranchise coastal
fishermen and other user groups to sue for takings of their re-
sources and livelihoods.' 79 The idea has its appeal, as there are few
stronger motivators than potential liability. The problem comes
with its application. As the law stands today, there is nothing to
prevent an individual user or user group from suing to enforce a
permit requirement against a violating discharger,' ° to apply a
more stringent water-quality-based limitation against a dis-
charger,'"' or to obtain damages for injury to livelihood based on
harmful discharges.' 8 2 The primary reason these remedies fail,
however, is because it is so difficult to demonstrate the causal link
between discharges and harm. It is a rare case that will prove dis-
176. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1044 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
("Under the pre-1970s legislation, federal pollution regulation relied principally but un-
successfully on the 'conference' with polluters.").
177. See PRETREATMENT, supra note 126, at 15.
178. Even these results will not be rapid. With all the federal and state-funded effort
that has gone into the Chesapeake Bay, the Bay studies took seven years to complete and
the first plan. outlining "strategies" for compliance, was not issued for another two years.
Coastal Policy, supra note 169, at 10406 n.38. Confirming my worst fears about never-
ending studies, see ,Ilbemarle-Panlico Estuarine Project First to Get Official CI1A Designation,
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1761 (Nov. 20. 1987) (observing that more
federally funded studies will provide "basic information on what makes the estuaries
tick").
179. See Tripp & Oppenheimer. Restoration of the Chesapeake Bay: A .1Iulti-State Institu-
tional Challenge, 47 MD. L. REv. 425, 449-50 (1988).
180. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982).
181. Id. § 1365(a)(2).
182. In the wake of Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n. 453 U.S. I (1981), damage actions henceforth likely will be based on state-law
theories.
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charge A caused harm B. This will always be so with respect to indi-
vidual discharges unless the standard for causation is lowered (in
which case it is a little hard to see what is left of the action: for
example if A discharges, is A liable on that basis?). The remedy
founders for the same reasons water-quality-based upgrading foun-
ders: even in the most polluted estuaries, even in the dead zones of
Louisiana, the causal connections are too difficult to establish.
Furthermore, individual discharges are not the primary culprit.
The plaintiff user-groups are really looking at a kaleidoscope of fed-
eral, state, and.private drainage ditches; farms and pesticide applica-
tors; and shopping centers, construction sites, landfills, and the like.
Houdini himself could not sort it out. No court would even try.
This leaves the prospect for a suit against a different defendant-the
state.
The vista here leaves one a little breathless. The state would be
liable for taking property by failing to abate pollution. The action
would not turn on negligence; nuisance; or any other balance of rea-
sons, motives, or needs. In effect, it would impose strict liability.
The action would not be barred by sovereign immunity, for it would
allege the violation of a constitutional right. It is the very sweep of
this action that will probably defeat it.
The grain of constitutional history sees the fifth and fourteenth
amendments as limitations on government appropriation of prop-
erty. 3 An appropriation, even a "regulatory taking," has tradition-
ally required an affirmative act.' 8 4 The acts here, namely, the state's
poor track record in pollution cleanup, are essentially negative.
Even as affirmative acts, they still sound in the negative: "You
didn't do enough." If characterized as takings, these governmental
acts would be difficult to distinguish from other governmental du-
ties.that, often against heavy odds, are poorly performed, or even
183. See. e.g.. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title & Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116
(1928) (delegation of legislative zoning powers by allowing neighborhood property
owners to approve or reject intended property use without any legislative standards
found unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon. 260 U.S. 393. 415 (1922) ("The general rule .. ,. is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.").
184. The accepted definition of a "taking" is a governmental artivity resulting in sig-
nificant physical damage to property that impairs its use. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166. 179-80 (1871). This activity, of course, does not have to be an
actual seizure of property: if the government causes an impairment of the use of the
land, that is also a taking. See. e.g.. United States v. Causby. 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (ruling
that low-flying government planes impaired a chicken farmer's use of his land, thus con.
stituting a taking).
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performed well but with poor results. Would not the failure of a
police force to control neighborhood crime, for example, be just as
much a taking of neighborhood property rights? Would the failure
to regulate bars or after-hours clubs also constitute a taking? To
classify negative acts as appropriations is, thus, somewhat open-
ended. In the case at hand, damages to coastal economic values are
even harder to establish than in the two previous hypotheticals be-
cause these values, unlike neighborhood homes, often do not be-
long to anyone. Granted, one will find oyster leases degraded and
ownership rights in certain resources simply destroyed. These prop-
erty rights do not constitute, however, the major values of the coast.
If restricted to traditional property rights, the remedy is of limited
scope. If, on the other hand, we expand the scope of plaintiffs to
those beyond traditional ownership, the concept of taking would
stretch beyond the point most courts would care to follow.' 8 5 At
this point, people who liked the neighborhood the way it was, crime-
free, would begin to sue too. I doubt their likelihood of success.
When all is said and done, the takings approach offers a conve-
nient shortcut around the difficulties of causation, duties, standards
of care, and sovereign immunity. A test case involving a specific pri-
vately owned resource (e.g., an oyster lease) and a specific govern-
mental failure (e.g., a group of discharge permits) could prove
interesting. More likely than not, however, the court would look to
abate the pollution under section 1313 of the CWA, or under more
traditional concepts of negligence or nuisance.
3. Impetus from Federal Programs: The Unused Musce.-Not san-
guine for the success of the "estuaries program" and not sold on a
taking claim, the search continues for a way to put strength behind
the upgrading of the Nation's estuaries. A more obvious answer lies
in the mechanisms the Congress has provided to enforce air quality
upgrading under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
The CWA provides substantia! grant funding to states for virtu-
ally the entire range of state water pollution control: sewage treat-
ment construction, water quality programs, nonpoint programs, and
toxic standards."". In the aggregate, construction funding in the
1987 fiscal year amounted to $1.8 billion and the program funding
185. See Louisiana v rd. Guste v. The MA' Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)
(court had difliculty in establishing the appropriate circle of plaintiffs damaged directly
by an identifiable marine accident). cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3271 (1986).
186. See 33 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982) (grants for research and development): id. § 1256
(pollulion control programs); id. § 1259 (training grants and contracts); see also Water
Quality Act of 1987, § 319(h) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h)) (grants for imple-
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another $270 million.' 8 7 In many states the federal grants, supple-
mented by state permit fees and fines, make up the entire water pl-
lution control budget.' 8 8 The obvious corollary here is that the
federal grants constitute considerable leverage in the game. One
opportunity for additional "muscle" would be to make these grants
contingent upon a state's success, or at least "reasonable progress,"
in achieving water quality standards, particularly in the coastal zone.
The difficulty in adopting this approach is that by denying the grant
funding, we would be jeopardizing the very programs that a state
needs to upgrade its water quality. The cure may kill the patient.
Furthermore, it does not apply the leverage where it can do the
most good.
The CAA affords an alternative model. The model is apt be-
cause attaining ambient air quality, as opposed to attaining technol-
ogy standards, is the primary mechanism of the CAA.'8 9 The CAA
encourages the attainment of air quality standards by sanctions that
are, if anything, almost too powerful to be effective. These sanc-
tions include the termination of federal aid and highway assist-
ance' 90 and an outright ban on the construction of new sources.191
I will concede that these measures, although often threatened, have
rarely been invoked.'9 2 Others will have to concede, however, that
when they have been invoked against even the most intransigent
states, these measures have brought results.' 9 3 They also carry their
mentation of nonpoint source programs); id. § 3 20(g) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1330(g)) (estuary programs).
187. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY-
SUMMARY OF THE 1987 BUDGET 77, 80 (Jan. 1986).
188. For example, of the $25 million budget of the Louisiana Department of Environ-
mental Quality, $10 million is provided by the federal government and $15 million is
derived from Department sources (e.g., permit fees, inspection fees, fines); no monies are
taken from state general revenues. Telephone interview with Darryn Serio, Fiscal Of-
ficer, Louisiana Dep't of Environmental Quality (Nov. 23, 1987).
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1982) (requiring EPA to develop air quality criteria and
control techniques); id. § 7409 (requiring the promulgation of national primary and sec-
ondary ambient air quality standards based upon the § 7408 criteria); id. § 7410 (requir-
ing state implementation plans to achieve and maintain the ambient air quality
standards).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a)(1) (1982) (conditioning transportation funding upon
compliance with national primary ambient air quality standards).
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(1) (1982) (imposing a ban on new construction ofany
major stationary sources if the emissions from such facilities will exceed national ambi-
ent air quality standards); id. § 7616 (conditioning sewage treatment construction fund-
ing upon compliance with certain stationary source and emission standards).
192. See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAw AND POLICY 241 (1984) [hereinafter F. ANDERSON] ("EPA was equally unenthusiastic
about the funding cutoff provisions.").
193. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980)
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own logic by applying the sanctions to activities that are, at bottom,
the political and economic causes of the problem. The CWA does
contain one analogous provision which authorizes the EPA to deny
sewer hookups to violating municipal sewage treatment systems.'
94
When invoked, or even threatened, it too has worked well.' 9 5 When
new construction is threatened, people start to listen.
Thus, the most effective "muscle" for state water quality up-
grading is a provision that would suspend federal assistance to all
activities in a coastal area that contribute to the degraded condition.
Suspensions should be made subject to findings of degradation ac-
cording to criteria that are susceptible to judicial review under the
citizen suit provisions of the CWA.' 96 On a given coast, these sus-
pensions may jeopardize Housing and Urban Development projects,
Soil Conservation Service and Corps of Engineer projects, federal
aid for highways, farm loans, and farm assistance. The assistance,
however, would not be enjoined forever. It need not even be en-
joined until the desired water quality is achieved, so long as the state
demonstrates reasonable progress."9 7 But the injunction, however
(denying Colorado complete approval of its state implementation plan, thereby causing
loss of $132 million in research and sewage treatment grants, as well as an unspecified
amount of federal highway funds), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981); Pacific Legal
Found. v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding a district court's denial of an
injunction restraining the EPA from enforcing a ban on construction or modification of
certain stationary sources of air pollution in California because of the legislature's fail-
ure to adopt a state implementation plan), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981); see also F.
ANDERSON, supra note 192, at 241 (noting that, under threat, Colorado and Michigan
decided to comply with the EPA and enact proper legislation).
194. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (1982).
195. Baton Rouge was so threatened. The EPA recently announced that it would seek
an injunction to stop all new sewer hookups within the parish limits (jeopardizing a $240
million sewerage upgrade program) and a $100-360 million fine if Baton Rouge did not
improve its sewer program. EPA gives council time to work out consent decree, Morning Advo-
cate (Baton Rouge), May 16, 1987, at A-I, col. 1.
196. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). For a discussion of the importance, and tribulations, of
cilizen suits under federal pollution control laws, see Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal
Pollution Control Laws, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10309 (Oct. 1983) (Part 1), and
14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10063 (Feb. 1984) (Part II).
197. A "reasonable progress" standard is one that the CAA imposes for new con-
struction in nonattainment areas, 42 U.S.C. § 7503() (1982). The EPA has also applied
this concept to its decisions on whether or not to impose sanctions under the CAA.
Sustained Progress. Extra Efforts Programs Face Serious Legal Risks, EPA Counsel Says, [Current
Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1291 (Dec. 5, 1986) [hereinafter Sustained Progress]. It
is expected that the EPA will not sanction any city that has made "reasonable efforts" at
attaining its national ambient air quality standards: "'We won't be aiming so much at
sanctions as at determining whether their heart is in the program and whether current
control measures are effective,' said Darryl Tyler, Director of the Control Program's
Development Division of EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards." Areas
That Miss Ozone Deadline Not Likely to Face Economic Sanction, EPA Official Says, [Current
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temporary, would allow state pollution control programs to go for-
ward while motivating those private interests at the root of the prob-
lem to become part of the solution. This is the only way the job is
going to get done.
IV. REMAKING A COASTAL ZONE
All the King's horses and All the King's men Couldn't put Humpty to-
gether again.
Mother Goose Nursery Rhyme
For large portions of the coastal United States, the measures
just proposed should be sufficient. The rocky coasts of Maine re-
quire only to be cleaned up a little and then left alone. The same
might be said for Oregon. But even if we could wave a magic wand
over many of our largest and most productive estuaries, immedi-
ately implementing the aforementioned programs, substantial
problems would still remain. Some estuaries have already perished.
Others are well on their way. The causes may be different from San
Francisco Bay to Nagshead, North Carolina, but they have a com-
mon factor: the effects of public works projects constructed and
maintained by the Corps. Because these causes are different, I will
discuss the experience of Louisiana, where the Corps has been most
active and where the consequences of its activities are the most
severe. 1
98
To summarize a long history, amply detailed elsewhere,' 9 9
about a century ago the Corps became involved in the effort to con-
tain the Lower Mississippi River for purposes of navigation and,
subsequently, flood control. By the 1920s the Corps had assumed
responsibility for the construction and maintenance of the main-
stream levees on the Mississippi and its outlets into the Gulf of Mex-
ico. This one project alone, so mighty in its ambition, has
successfully passed ship traffic into and out of the heartland of
America, keeping the population of South Louisiana relatively dry in
Developmentsi Env't Rep. (BNA) 2179 (Apr. 12, 1985). The EPA's sustained progress
and reasonable extra efforts programs are designed to give cities more time to reach
their national ambient air quality standards without imposing "draconian" sanctions
such as construction bans. Sustained Progress, supra, at 1291.
198. For a discussion of the consequences of Corps activities in the Louisiana coastal
zone, see Houck, supra note 2, at 30-44 (and sources cited therein).
199. SeeJ. KEMPER, REBELLIOUS RIVER (1949); H. CARTER, LOWER MISSISSIPPI (1942);
Kazmann & Johnson, Ilhat If the Old River Control Structure Fails?, LA. WATER RESOURCES
INST. BULL., Sept. 1980, at 12; K. Hebert, The Flood Control Capabilities of the AItchafalaya
Basin Floodway, LA. WATER RESOURCES INST. BULL., Apr. 1967, at 5; Houck, supra note 2,
at 16-30 (and sources cited therein). The history that follows is taken from these
sources.
398 [VOL. 47:358
ENDING THE WAR
the process. It has also had the unforeseen effect of eliminating the
fresh water, sediments, and nutrients that the Mississippi had spread
out across South Louisiana each year during the spring floods.
These elements had been responsible for nourishing the plant life,
accreting new sand bars, forming new deltas, and holding the Gulf
of Mexico at bay. For the past 5,000 years, South Louisiana had
been a land-winner--the fastest growing land mass in the United
States. Following the completion of the Mississippi levee and jetty
system, Louisiana became a land-loser-at an alarming and increas-
ing rate. All the elements that built this coastal plain have been
eliminated. Sixty thousand tons of sediments a day are funneled off
the Gulf shelf as waste matter. The coast has been starved; it is dy-
ing, en masse.
The Mississippi project is but one Corps activity. The scope
and diversity of all Corps projects in this region are unimaginably
large and nearly impossible to convey without the aid of a map.
Within the Mississippi delta alone lie more than a dozen commercial
waterways averaging 8 feet in depth and 80 feet in width, some as
wide as 1,000 feet, each dredged and maintained by the Corps, to-
taling more than 300 miles.200 Another dozen such projects cut
through marshes to the west of New Orleans, and across the entire
coastal plain of the Gulf Intercoastal Waterway, averaging 12 feet by
50 feet, and adding 302 miles of mainstem and another 76 miles of
side canals.20 ' Along these navigation systems lie the ports of New
Orleans, Baton Rouge, Lake Charles, La Place, Point A la Hache,
and two dozen more-all federally constructed and maintained.20 2
At this point, were the federal hand in Louisiana's coastal land
loss not already unmistakable, we could look further north up the
Mississippi River. There we would find a series of mainstream dams
and locks that have served, among other things, as sediment traps,
drastically reducing the loads transported to South Louisiana. His-
torically, these loads were more than sufficient to offset the natural
rates of subsidence. Recent Corps studies indicate that these sedi-
ment loads have decreased substantially during the last twenty
years. 03 In the view of several experts, were the Mississippi to be
magically returned to its original contours and allowed to overflow
at will, the coastline might, at best, with these reduced silt loads,
hold its own. They are no longer talking about "restoring" the
200. See Houck, supra note 2, at 44-51 (and sources cited therein).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See PANEL REPORT, supra note 2. at 16.
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coast. They are talking about trying to hold onto what is left.2 °4
With some 40 percent of the Nation's coastal wetlands at stake, what
is left is clearly worth saving. But it will take measures, indeed a
perspective, that we have only recently begun to allow ourselves to
consider. It will mean unleashing the Corps upon the coast once
again on grand scale, not with the mission of taming it, but with the
mission of saving it.2 0
5
To many, and to me not so many years ago, the Corps would
appear as an unlikely savior of any ecosystem, particularly the coast.
The Corps' mission in flood control and navigation has always over-
shadowed its "consideration" of environmental protection. Projects
that actually benefited the environment, such as non-structural ap-
proaches to flood control, remain the exception to a general rule of
remedies constructed of concrete and mud, easily justified to the
Corps and to Congress by their achievement of "primary" (e.g.,
flood control) goals.20 6 Projects which are justified upon the basis of
environmental benefit are few and far between. There is, however,
no way to deal the Corps out of a lead role in restoring the coast.
We will need to re-engineer dams, waterways, levees, and canal sys-
tems. We may even need to re-engineer the Mississippi River itself,
to let it run free of its levees, and to run navigation exclusively
through canals.
Two legislative developments offer hope for a more affirmative
Corps role. The first, at this point only a Senate bill, directs the
Corps to identify the Nation's ten most threatened coastlines and to
draw up action plans on an expedited basis to protect them.2 07 The
bill provides $30 million a year to implement each action plan; the
funding is to be derived from taxes on gasoline-powered equipment
that are currently funneled into the federal Highway Trust Fund.20 8
204. Dr. Sherwood Gagliano, head of the consulting firm of Coastal Environments,
Inc., is of the opinion that the Louisiana coastal environment will never return to the
vast marshlands of only two generations ago. In fact, he believes that "we won't be able
to keep it the way it is today." See Erosion Expert: La. needs plan to save marshes from ruin,
Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Nov. 10, 1984, at A-26. col. 2.
205. For a description of currently proposed Corps restoration projects in the Louisi-
ana coastal zone, see PANEL REPORT, suipra note 2, at 61-78; Houck, supra note 2, at 102-
27.
206. See NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DEEP DRAFIT Ac-
CESS TO THE PORTS OF NEW ORLEANS AND BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA (July 1981) (docu-
menting the Corps' plan for sediment distribution in association with its project to
deepen the Mississippi River to a 55-foot depth).
207. The bill is Senate Bill 655. introduced by Senator John Breaux of Louisiana.
Coastal W1'etlands Recove
, 
Act Would Have Corps Save Wetlands, LAND LETTER, Sept. I. 1987.
at 6-7.
208. Id.
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In its favor, this proposal calls for action on specific timetables and
provides funding on a user-fee basis that has worked well for other
construction and restoration projects. Conceptually, it gives the
Corps a new mission-saving Mother Nature °.2 0  At this point, how-
ever, it is only a proposal and it will predictably face resistance from
both an administration unwilling to spend on any domestic program
and from the present beneficiaries of the Highway Trust Fund.
The second legislative initiative is contained in the Water Re-
sources Development Act of 1986,2 " a law that opens the way for
more beneficial Corps projects. Under various water resources stat-
utes, and for various purposes, the Corps proposes projects to Con-
gress based upon the economic principle that the benefits of these
projects exceed their costs. 21' Because environmental benefits are
difficult to quantify, Corps projects justified on improving the envi-
ronment have not made it past that threshold.
These statutes also impose requirements of cost-sharing that
have proven a deterrent.2 1 Local communities, navigational inter-
ests, and other beneficiaries might be willing to "ante up" for a pro-
ject that will generate economic growth; environmental growth does
not provoke the same self-interested response. Environmental cost-
sharers are as hard to find as environmental benefits are to quantify.
On both scores, environmental projects founder.
The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 is a remarkable
amalgam of the old and the new. It authorizes a large number of
old-style projects based on concrete and mud.2 t3 On the other
hand, it imposes new cost-sharing restrictions that may deter some
particularly bad ideas in the future, in particular the massively ex-
pensive and marginally justified navigation projects that have
affected so much of the public works and the politics of the
209. To its credit, in the absence of this new global authority, the Corps is moving
forward in Louisiana with studies that, in effect, accomplish something of the same re-
suit. One initiative will attempt, over the next year, to set up an institutional arrange-
ment to develop projects to defend the coast. See Corps seeks funds for land-loss study,
Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge), Oct. 19, 1987, at B-I, col. 1. A second initiative will
look at what has been, to date, an idea in the order of heresy-the possibility of setting
free the Lower Mississippi below New Orleans. Id. Granted, these are not yet "action
plans," and much more will be lost before they become working projects. But they rep-
resent an historic step toward a more affirmative Corps role in coastal protection than
concrete bulkheads and pumping sand.
210. Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (1986).
211. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1982) (benefits of improving navigable waters and
tributaries for flood-control purposes must exceed costs).
212. See id. § 701(h) (cost-sharing for flood-control work).
213. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 101, 100 Stat.
4082, 4082-84 (1986) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2211).
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South.' 14 Of particular importance to coastal restoration, however,
are the following five provisions:
1. Section 101(c). The costs of "constructing projects or meas-
ures for the prevention or mitigation of erosion or shoaling dam-
ages attributable to Federal navigation works" shall be allocated in
the same proportion as the cost-sharing provisions applicable to the
original projects.2"' Because all of the major navigation projects of
coastal Louisiana have been federally funded at 100 percent, the ef-
fect of this provision should be to eliminate the cost-sharing re-
quirement for those measures now needed to contain the damage.
2. Section 906(b). The Corps is authorized to "mitigate dam-
ages to fish and wildlife resulting from any water resources pro-
ject.,,216 "Mitigation," in Corps parlance, refers to monies needed
.to offset losses to natural resources caused by a project. 217 This
mitigation is now provided for projects, "whether completed, under
construction, or to be completed," within a dollar ceiling of $30 mil-
lion a year and $7.5 million per project. 1 8 Costs are to be allocated
proportionally to the original projects which, again, for the most
part, are 100 percent federally funded.21 9
3. Section 906(e). The Corps is also authorized to "enhance
fish and wildlife resources," a term of art in water resources plan-
ning that refers to providing new benefits unrelated to damages
caused in the past.22 ° If a project benefits resources of "national
economic importance," which should include much of the coast, or
endangered species, which much of the coast contains, or national
wildlife refuges, which are scattered across the coast, the construc-
tion costs, once again, are 100 percent federal.
4. Section 907. Furthermore, in formulating all water re-
sources projects, the "benefits attributable to . . . environmental
quality, including improvements of the environment and fish and
wildlife enhancement, shall be deemed at least equal to the costs of
such measures.' 12 By legislative fiat, environmental benefits now
equal costs.
214. See id. § 102(a) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2212) (cost sharing for inland wa-
terway projects).
215. Id. § 101(c) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2211).
216. Id. § 906(b)(I) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1283).
217. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-663 (1982).
218. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 906(b)(1), 100
Stat. 4082, 4186 (1986) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2283).
219. Id. § 906(c) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2283).
220. Id. § 906(e) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2283).
22 1. Id. § 907 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2284).
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5. Section 1135. Lastly, the Corps is authorized to review the
"operation of water resources projects." To accomplish this task,
the Corps is empowered to carry out a "demonstration program...
for the purpose of making such modifications in the structures and
operations" of these projects that will be "feasible and consistent
with the authorized project purposes" and "will improve the quality
of the environment in the public interest." '222 For these project
modifications, however, local sponsors will shoulder 25 percent of
the costs and the total federal contribution will not exceed $25
million. 2
It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of these new provi-
sions. The Corps has yet to promulgate regulations implementing
and interpreting them. The administration has yet fully to fund
them. Corps field personnel are viewing them with some degree of
confusion. 2 4 Nonetheless, it seems clear that, short of conferring a
new coast-saving mission, these provisions should encourage the
Corps to become more engaged in several types of coastal restora-
tion work. Existing navigation projects can be modified to prevent
erosion and mitigate their damages without cost-sharing or cost-
benefit constraints. All existing projects can be reviewed with an
eye toward mitigation, but within a $30 million ceiling. Enhance-
ment projects may be planned for resources of "national economic
importance," again without cost-sharing or cost-benefit ratio re-
quirements, but without explicit provision for their funding as well.
Project operations may be modified to enhance coastal resources,
but with a 25 percent local cost share and within a $25 million
ceiling.
This progress noted, the limitations of the Water Resources De-
velopment Act of 1986 are obvious. Remedies are authorized, but
none are directed. For those remedies with authorized funding, the
funding is simply not enough. One long overdue freshwater diver-
sion project on the Lower Mississippi River will cost about as much
to construct as the statute's annual mitigation fund. 5 Local gov-
ernments must still pay for 25 percent of the costs of project opera-
222. Id. § i 135(a)-(b) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2294).
223. Id. § 1135(b), (e) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2294).
224. Telephone interviews with Joey Dykes, New Orleans District, and Lawrence Bar-
nett, Mississippi River Valley Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Nov. 2-3, 1987).
225. The Caernarvon freshwater diversion project located 15 miles below New Orle-
ans will cost $25 million. Erosion-stopping water project gets approval, Times-Picayune (New
Orleans), June 18, 1987, at B-12, col. 1. The Water Resources Development Act's miti-
gation fund is authorized at $35 million a year. Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 908, 100 Stat.
4082, 4188 (1986) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2285).
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tions, which include maintenance dredging. The current least-cost,
maintenance dredging practices will continue to waste a major po-
tential source of sediments, marsh creation, and marsh restoration.
New projects will still be competing, within a limited treasury,
against other projects of demonstrable economic benefit. Regard-
less of the relaxed legal requirements for favorable cost-benefit ra-
tios, no new project of any scale is going to proceed until it can
justify itself economically. This justification will require the Corps
to acknowledge and quantify all of the economic benefits that coasts
provide in flood protection, storm surge reduction, water purifica-
tion, and other functions that-were it using the same ingenuity to
justify a new lake in Georgia, for example-it would have already
found quantifiable and persuasive. Economics still will be the key.
From past perspective, the Water Resources Development Act
of 1986 is a positive step forward. From the perspective of ten years
into the future, when the steps needed may total billions of dollars,
the Act is patently inadequate. Whether it comes from Senate Bill
655 or some other legislation, the Corps needs an affirmative mis-
sion to develop restoration projects as a first priority. Whether it
comes from the proposed gasoline tax, a seafood and fisheries tax,
or from taxes based on navigation, oil imports, oil and gas pipe-
lines 2 6-or all of the above-the Corps will need a stable fund that
is adequate and resistent to predation. It is too late in the day, and
the case is too urgent, simply to allow restoration projects to fight
for the shrinking federal dollar on a more equal footing. We need
the natural resources equivalent of the Manhattan Project. The one
agency that can pull it off is ready for its marching orders.
V. CONCLUSION
It is time to stop fooling around. A few parts of our coastline
are holding their own. Most are deteriorating. Some are in a state
of total collapse. Either we act more forcefully to save America's
most important ecosystem, or we should stop spending the money
and effort on halfway measures that simply forestall the inevitable,
in the fashion of cut flowers.
While there is no single solution, this article has identified sev-
eral beginning principles:
226. For a discussion of a tax on oil and gas pipelines across the Louisiana coastal
zone based upon environmental damages, see Pierce, The Constitutionality of State Environ-
mental Taxes, 58 TUL. L. REV. 169 (1983); Edwards. Zehner & Moore, Constitutional and
Policy Implications of Louisiana 's Proposed Environmental Energy Tax: Political Expediency of Ef-
fective Regulation?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 215 (1983).
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(1) We need to zone, or buy outright, the remaining undevel-
oped coastline so that in the years ahead undeveloped coastline
remains;
(2) We need to develop nondestructive technologies to ac-
complish the work of the coastline-the harvest of nonrenewable
(e.g., oil and gas) and renewable (e.g., fisheries) resources;
(3) We need to end our reliance upon water as a carrier and
assimilator of human wastes, and instead find productive uses for
these wastes;
(4) In the interim, we need to end the introduction of indus-
trial pollutants into our sewage treatment systems, a practice far
more harmful than the benefits purported to flow from it;
(5) We need to upgrade the water quality of the coastal zone
by using the full leverage of federal aid to require sound conserva-
tion practices and "reasonable progress" in abating pollution at its
various sources; and
(6) We need to rebuild the coast itself.
These measures do not call for the introduction of a socialist
state. They do not preempt state or local abatement options. At
least one measure calls for less federal presence and expenditure
than that currently required. But they all have a common denomi-
nator: in each case, the federal government is going to have to take
responsibility in a markedly different fashion. It will have to admit
that some programs need more muscle, and that others have failed
for need of a new approach. In an era of "federalism "-which in
our case means turning environmental responsibilities over to state
and local governments-these suggestions are not in vogue. Tant
pis. They are necessary.
For if ever there were a federal interest in a natural resource-
richer than the Rocky Mountains, more biologically important than
even the wildlife of Alaska-it is in America's coastal zone. There is
no place here for faint hearts or the ideologues of laissezfaire. This is
the place to take a stand.
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